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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEI1 AND DE?I NITION OF TERl1S USED 
Huey Pierce Long was one of the most flamboyant 
. 
and controversial political leaders of the early twentieth 
century. Elected. Governor of Louisiana in 1928 on the 
platform "Every Man a King," Long soon became nationally 
known for his erratic and picturesque behavior as 11 the 
Kingfish.n 
The New York Times heralded the election of Huey 
Long as Governor of the Pelican State as the appearance of 
11 a worthy competitor in the field of light political 
farce. 111 Later, many persons realized. that the statement 
was not entirely accurate. ~ibat LoUisiana received in 
Huey Long was highly political, but it was far from being 
light and farcical. 
There were laughs, to be sure; Long did. not 11see any 
harm in lightening up the tragedy of politics" with his 
burlesque-show antics. Although he felt that "it cut both 
ways, 11 he rationalized that even his critics "wouldn't have 
heard. of Huey Long to stab at him if it hadn't been for the 
K1ngfish and some tomfoolery.u2 
1 News item in The New ~ Times, January 29, 1928. 
2Quoted. 1n Forrest Davis, Huey Long: A Candid 
Biography (New York: Dodge Publishing Company, 1935), p. 57. 
As chief executive for the people of Louisiana, Long 
flouted the trad.itions of an ordinarily d.ignified. office. 
His Excellency conducted. affairs of state from his bedroom 
of his suite in Baton Rouge 's Heidelberg Hotel; engaged in 
fisticuffs;J and., although 11not much of a singer, 11 received. 
"plenty of encores" as "The Singing Fool" at the Frolics 
cabaret in New Orleans' Vieux Carre.4 
Such conduct, however, failed. to "break his power" 
and Long, as governor, initiated a legislative program 
which marked. a significant departure from Jeffersonian 
traditions in the politics of Louisiana.5 
I • THE PROBLEM 
Statement 2f the problem. The purpose of this study 
was to show the relationship between representative 
legislation of the Long administration and. certain social, 
economic, and political conditions existing in Louisiana at 
that time. 
JFrancis Butler Simkins, A History of the South (New 
York: Alfred. A. Knopf, 1961), p: 545. -----
4News item in the New Orleans Times- Picayune, March 
30, 1929. 
5simkins, 2E• £11., pp. 544-45. 
2 
3 
Importance 2!_ ~ study. Much of the Huey Long image 
that exists today was created by the press of Louisiana. 
Ranging in topic from a lighthearted campaign to determine 
the proper etiquette of eating 11 corn pone and pot-likker116 
to a bloody fight in the restroom of a fashionable resort,? 
"the Kingfish," with his ungrammatical speech and unpolished. 
8 
mannerisms, was 11 good. copy." 
The major newspapers of Louisiana, the Baton Rouge 
State Times, the Times-Picayune, ~ Shreveport Times, and. 
the New Orleans Item, as well as the numerous rural weeklies 
of the state, were constantly opposed. to long. 9 In the 
early months of the Long administration, the New Orleans 
Times-Picayune, the most influencial newspaper of the state, 
came out in favor of 11any properly organized movement to 
compel Governor Long to vacate his office.n10 Editorially, 
~ews item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 
26, 1931. Long invited other governors to express their 
views on how the 11 d.electable concoction should be eaten." 
?News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, August 
27, 1933· 
8News item in The ~ I2t! Times, January 24, 1928. 
9stan Optowsky, The Longs of Louisiana {New York: 
E. P. Dutton and. Company,-Inc., 19'00), pp. 2ZI-7-4·9· For 
fifteen years Optowsky was a staff reporter for the Times-
PicaYl!le• 
10 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 
25, 1929. 
Colonel John E. Ewing , owner-publisher of The Shreveport 
Times and. the Baton Rouge State Times , called for Governor 
Long to be impeached. . 11 In New Orleans, the press openly 
charged. that the Governor was a Hitler of the swamplands , a 
Mussolini of the bayous, a d.emagogue, a dictator , and. a man 
"tempermentally unfit" to hold. office . 12 
These labels , which have survived to the present, 
have been re-enforced. by various studies of the Huey Long 
governorship drawn, in large part , from newspaper accounts . 
Today, therefore , it is customary to dismiss Long as an 
"American Fasc1st . n13 The epithet , however, is misleading 
and. d.oes not offer an explanation to the phenomenon that 
was Huey Long . 
The Louisiana that witnessed. the inauguration of 
Huey Long in 1928 could. hardly be termed. a modern state . 
The state highway system had only three major bridges , less 
than three hundred. miles of cement highways, and. merely 
thirty-five miles of road.ways with asphalt surfacing . The 
11News item in ~Shreveport Times , March 24, 1929. 
12 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 
25, 1929. 
l3T . Harry Williams, Romance and. Realism in Southern 
Politics (Athens: University of Georgia Press , 1960), p . 73 . 
4 
state supported educational program, from the elementary 
level to the state lmiversity , was inadequate . The per 
cent of illiteracy was more than three times that of the 
nation as a whole . Of its residents over ten years of age , 
13 . 5 per cent were 1.mable to read and write . 14 
Thus, for Hamilton Basso , who disagreed with those 
who saw Long as a power-mad. d.i c ta tor 
to wave aside his road.s , his free schoolbooks , his 
schoolbus service , his new schoolhouses, his tax reduc-
tions, his debt moratorium , his abolition of the poll 
tax, is to wave aside some of the most important reasons 
for his continued success . It is to make th~ people of 
Louisiana absolute fools and. idiots . After the control 
first of the plantations , banking , railroad and utility 
interests , then the New Orleans Ring •• i Huey [Long] 
came as a welcome , even wholesome relief . 5 
II . DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED 
The Ring . Throughout this study, the term "the New 
Orleans Ring" is defined as an unchartered coalition of 
Orleans Parish [New Orleans] politicians , industrialists, 
and planters who attempted to keep in office men favorable 
to Orleans Parish and. their particular interests . During 
14computed from the United States Bureau 
Fifteenth Census of the United States: 122Q. 
Government Printing Office , 1935) . 
of the Census 
(Washington: 
15Hamilton Basso , Mainstream (New York : Harcourt, Brace 
and Company, 1943) , P• 57 . 
5 
the first third. of the twentieth century, the mayor of the 
Crescent City, Martin Behrman, was the central figure in . 
Ring activities. 
North and south Louisiana. The cultural and. religious 
contrasts within Louisiana have led. to the frequent 
application of the framework "north Louisiana" and "south 
Louisiana" to many fields of study. Fifty-four of the 
sixty-four parishes are either more than two-thirds Catholic 
16 
or more than two-third.s Protestant, as shown in Figure 1. 
Generally speaking neither aggressive Catholicism nor 
anticlericalism has been the norm of state politics, but on 
occasions religious differences have provided. a foundation 
for political d.ivisions.17 
III. DELIMITATION OF STUDY 
This study is concerned. with certain political, 
social, and. economic activities in Louisiana from !>lay 21, 
1928, until January 25, 1932: the Long administration. 
16 T. Lynn Smith and. Homer L. Nitt, The People of 
Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1952), P• 327. 
17The hypocricy of the upland.er is too much for the 
Gallic mind.: "In north Louisiana, 11 as the saying goes, 11 a 
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Mention of conditions not included within this period is 
mad.e only in ord.er to give a more complete u.nd.erstand ing of 
the era . 
IV. SOURCES AND TREATJIIENT OF DATA 
The research facilities of the Louisiana State 
University in New Orleans , Tulane University, and the New 
Orleans Public Libraries were employed in this stUdy. In 
addition , the private collection of Long material owned 
by Harnett T. Kane was consulted. . 
In an attempt to give a degree of continuity to the 
study, a brief prelude to the Long administration is 
given. It includes a brief sketch of Huey Long ' s background. 
and education as well as certain social and political 
traditions of Louisiana. 
The main bod.y of this study is an analysis of the 
governorship of Huey Long. No attempt was made to classify 
Long, nor was a moral judgment made, or implied, concerning 
Long's "private" life or his administrative ability. The 
study was an analysis , not a jud.gment . 
8 
CHAPTER II 
PRELUDE TO THE KINGFISH 
The legacy of class conflict in nineteenth-century 
Louisiana served as more than a backc1rop for the rise of 
Huey Long; traditional class antagonisms comprised. much of 
the deep emotional and symbolic content of Longism itself. 
I • RELICS OF POPULISM 
The basis of Populist protest in Louisiana stemmed 
from the post-Civil War continuation of the plantation 
system through the credit devices of the sharecrop and the 
crop-lien and. through the absolute increase in both the 
number of plantations and the acreage controlled by them.1 
A southern myth has long pictured the Civil War as 
breaking up the great plantations and "purging" the South 
of all vestiges of planter aristocracy. In addition, 
historians have cited evidence in abundance to certify the 
death of the plantation system and the birth of an agrarian 
2 
revolution. According to census reports, the number of 
1Roger w. Shugg, "Survival of the Plantation System 
in Louisiana," Journal of Southern History, II (August, 
1937), 311-25. 
2 E.g., Charles and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of the 
American Civilization (New York: The 1-1acmillan Company, 
1927), II, 196; Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele 
Commager, The Growth of the American Republic (New York: 
Oxford University Fress,-r930), p. 627. 
11 farms 11 in the South increased from 449,936 in 1860 to 
1 , 110, 294 in 1880 and more than 17, 430 , 000 acres were ad.d.ed. 
to the total acreage of farmland . In the same period the 
size of the average 11 farm" declined from 347 acres to 156 
acres . 3 
Although considerable redistribution of real estate 
ownership did take place , the portioning- out of plantation 
lands in small plots among croppers was more a reflection 
of the revolution in the methods of labor and. finance than 
it was a revolution in land. tenure . Under the sharecrop 
system plots were worked by croppers who shared the prod.uce 
with the landlords; but these subdivisions did not change 
their ownership . Each plot worked. by a cropper , however , 
constituted. a separate "farm" within the definition under 
which the census marshals worked. . Thus the perpetuation of 
the plantation pattern tended to be obscured . In Catahoula 
Parish, for example , 171 "farms 11 of less than twenty acres 
were reported. by census marshals in 1890, although the 
local tax assessor could find only nineteen . 4 
3 United States Bureau of the Census, Tenth Census 
of the United. States: 1880 . Statistics of Agriculture , Vol . 
III-rwashington : Government Printing Office , 1884), p . 25. 
4Roger w. Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in 
Louisiana, 1880- 1895 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univer-
sity Press , 1939), pp . 235-36 . 
10 
Where the soil was less fertile, in the Florida 
Parishes,5 southwestern pine flats, and northern uplands, 
the farmers turned to commercial 1 umbering. Although they 
did not stop raising their food and. as much cotton as they 
could., they also cut into the timberlands for a 11 cash 
crop.u 6 
11 
Several northern lumber syndicates entered Louisiana 
about 1880 along the railways, purchased large tracts of 
public and. private lands, and. cut a wid.e swath through the 
forests of the state. It was a common procedure for these 
companies to homestead their employees on public land and 
then strip it of timber; in this manner they acqUired. 
lumber for less than one-tenth the normal price. Railroads 
also joined the lucrative business. The Texas and. Pacific 
"backbone grant" up the Red. River, through the center 
of the oak and. long-leaf pine forests, aroused. local 
Populism by dispossession of squatters and farmers. 
The lumber companies received. most of the timber. The 
5The five northeastern parishes of Louisiana, 
between the Mississippi and Pearl rivers, are called the 
Florida parishes because Spain retained. them as part of 
West Florida when retroceding Louisiana to France in 1800. 
They became part of the United. States by insurrection in 
1810. 
6 Shugg, .Ql?.. ill• , p. 268. 
12 
extent of their operation may be judged. by the situation in 
Rapides Parish, where there were fifteen sawmills in 1886; 
the largest one, owned by a New York syndicate, turned out 
250,000 board feet per d.ay. 7 
By the end. of the nineteenth century it was apparent 
that the farmers of Louisiana had become d.eeply involved in 
the commercial "cotton and. cawn" economy. The acreage 
planted in cotton was greater than that alloted. to corn, 
and the cultivation of either occupied more acres than any 
8 
other crop. 
The specialization in cotton was accompanied. by the 
growth of tenancy. To grow cotton at all, the poorer 
farmers had to go into d.ebt for "seed. and furnish;tt and the 
larger the d.ebt grew, the greater the amount of cotton they 
attempted to grow. 
In 1894, after three d.ecad.es of decline, cotton 
prices bottomed at 4 .J cents per pound.. The damage to crops 
by the flood.ing Mississippi and Red rivers in 1891-92 and. 
the Credit Panic of 1893 additionally depressed the agri-
7shugg, 2-E· ill·. p. 269. 
8united States Bureau of the Census, Tenth Census 
of the United. States: 1880. Reports on Cotton Production, 
vo1:-v (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1884), P• 
67. 
cultural economy.9 It was the combined impact of these 
economic pressures which drove the farmers to seek redress 
through politics. 
Farmer agitation in Louisiana up to the 1890's had. 
limited itself to working within the Democratic party. The 
willingness of Democrats to agree to agrarian demands was 
tempered by their convictions that farmers would not d.o any 
thing to endanger the maintenance of white supremacy. 
13 
Continued Democratic rejection of farmer proposals, however, 
served. to move more aggressive farmers toward third-party 
activities. 
In the Congressional election of 1890, farmers in 
the Fourth Congressional District, taking in nearly all of 
north-central and. northwestern Louisiana, countered the 
Democratic maneuvering by holding a rump convention in 
Natchitoches. Although the farmers' candidate was d.efeated. 
in 1890, within two years the farmers of Louisiana were 
organized in the Populist party.10 
The normal tactic of Louisiana Populists, similar to 
the agrarian protest in other southern states, was to ally 
9Melvin J. White, "Populism in Louisiana During the 
Nineties, 11 The IUssissippi Valley Historical Review, V 
(June, 1918},4. 
10 
Ibid.., PP• 7-8, 11. 
with the other minority party. In the Pelican State the 
Populists• "great stronghold" was in the hill parishes of 
the northwest, peopled mainly by small white farmers . 
The movement 11never gained much of a foothold. in the cotton 
parishes of the delta , or in the sugar parishes, and was 
never strong in the cities . n11 
The election of 1892 provided no reflection of the 
state's farmer influence because the dominant issue was the 
fate of the Louisiana Lottery Company . The topic so 
divided the Democratic party that one pro-Lottery Democrat 
and one anti-Lottery Democrat ran in the general election. 
In addition, farmer delegates from the Florida parishes and 
southwestern and northern Louisiana put forward an inde-
pendent Populist ticket . The Populist made a poor showing 
and. carried only the parishes of Catahoula, Vernon , Winn, 
and. Grant . 12 
The scene was set for a widespread revolt against 
the Democratic party by the time of the state election of 
1896. The severe droughts of 1895 which affected. the 
farmers of southwest and. north Louisiana intensified. farmer 
11 
Ibid., PP • 14-15 . 
12Berthold c. Alwes , "The History of the Louisiana 
State Lottery Company , " Louisiana Historical Quarterly 
XXVII (October , 1944), 964-1118 . 
14 
discontent. In the Crescent City, New Orleans reformers 
entered a candidate for mayor against the nominee of the 
city machine. And in the sugar bowl region, planters, 
fearing Grover Cleveland. 1 s tariff policies, aligned with 
the Republicans . 
After consid.erable friction, the Populists, sugar 
planters, and Republicans settled on a state slate headed 
by gubernatorial candid.ate John Pharr, a Republican sugar 
planter from St. Mary Parish. The Democrats nominated 
Governor Murphy J. Foster, the anti-Lottery candidate in 
1892, for re-election on a platform which avoided issues of 
13 
concern to farmers. 
The areas of the state most hostile to and most 
receptive to the Populists are shown in Figure 2. The 
stronghold.s of the agrarian protest were the north-central 
uplands and the Florida parishes. The spread of small 
farmers into the southwestern part of the state and into 
the second tier of parishes bordering on the northeastern 
Delta parishes explained Populist appeal in those areas. 
Anti-Populist areas included the planter parishes of the 
Bed River and Mississippi River deltas, the Felicianas, and 
13Lena M. Vegas, "The Populist Party in Louisiana" 
(unpublished. Master's thesis, Tulane University, New 
Orleans, 1942), pp. 97-103, 113. 
1 I !\I {\ '-
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the parishes containing the urban centers of Shreveport, 
Monroe , Alexandria , and New Orleans . 
17 
Although the parish-vote patterns revealed for the 
election of 1896 are shaded. by some deviations , it may be 
generally presumed that Populism brought to a peak the 
expression of class antagonisms in Louisiana . The develop-
ment of observable differences in the planter- farmer and the 
rural-urban voting behavior is particularly noteworthy 
since these elements are essential to the und.erstand.ing of 
the patterns of support for and. opposition to Huey Long in 
the gubernatorial elections of 1924 and 1928 and the 1930 
Congressional election . 
The Democrats of the Pelican State were sufficiently 
impressed. by the Populist showing to grant significant 
concessions to them in preparation for the presidential 
election of 1896. The Democrats formally allied with the 
Populists , giving them one-half the electors and enabling 
them to support Tom Watson for vice-president on the Bryan 
ticket . Although Populist leaders predicted that the fate 
of their party would. be enhanced by the fusion , the 1896 
presid.ent!al election marked. the decline of Populism as a 
separate party in Louisiana. In the twentieth century, no 
Populist leader was to enter either a Congressional or a 
state race . 
18 
The new willingness of Democrats to pen agrarian 
reforms into the Louisiana Constitution of 1898 was one 
factor in the rapid decline of the Populist party. The 
document created, among other things, a State Board of 
Appraisers to assess utility companies, agencies to regulate 
banks and railroads, and a State Board of Agriculture and 
Immigration. The new Constitution also brought about, to 
the applause of both Democrats and Populists, the effective 
disfranchisement of the Negro . 
By the start of the twentieth century, Louisiana had. 
seemingly achieved. class harmony within one big party, 
unified by considerations of race. Populism was dead. The 
Negro was politically sterile . The situation gave rise to 
a number of interrelated. consequences, including a dulling 
of issues, d.eclining voter turnouts, and continued control 
of the party by the same inner clique. 
II. THE NEW ORLEANS RING 
The Choctaw Club of New Orleans, since its formation 
in 1897, has been an organization of professional politi-
cians seeking to maintain control of the Orleans Parish 
government. Known more commonly as the 11 ring, 11 the 
"Choctaws," or, after a factional riff in the early 1920's, 
as the "old regulars, 11 this organization has constituted. 
a Democratic machine similar in objective and. method.s to 
the city machines in various non- southern states . A study 
of the operation of the New Orleans Ring in LoUisiana poli-
tics is not a direct concern of this investigation and., in 
ad.di tion, has alread.y been successfully undertaken. 14 Of 
19 
greater significance here is the presentation of material 
which demonstrates how the New Orleans Ring became the 
controlling force in Louisiana politics and the consequences 
for public policy of that control . 
The primacy of the Crescent City in state politics 
was the natural outcome of its number of voters and. its 
share of seats in the Legislature and. in the state central 
committee of the Democratic party.l5 In state primary 
elections the New Orleans vote constituted over one-fifth 
of the state vote. Und.er the Constitution of 1898, Orleans 
was alloted. twenty of the one-hund.red. representatives and 
eight of thirty-nine Senators . A similar proportion of the 
state central committee of the Democratic party was granted 
to New Orleans . The city of New Orleans , therefore , could 
14 This evaluation of the New Orleans Ring relies 
heavily on George M. Reynolds , Machine Politics in New 
Orleans (New York : Columbia University Press, 19~):--
15The city of New Orleans is co-extensive with the 
Parish of Orleans . The Commission Council was the govern-
ing bod.y of both and was , therefore, both a state and a 
municipal agent for all purposes of local government . 
be the decisive factor in the election of state officials, 
the referenda of amend.ments to the Constitution, passage 
of legislation, and. in shaping party rules •16 
The Ring's superior position in Louisiana politics 
was the natural outgrowth of Orleans Parish 1 s d.epend.ence 
20 
upon and vulnerability to the governor and the Legislature. 
Following the pattern set by the 1879 Constitution, the 
Constitutions of 1898 and 1921 were miserly in their 
grants of po1-1er to parish and city governments . Local 
issues were, consequently, cast into state politics. Thus, 
to maintain their position in city politics the Ring was 
forced to concern itself with the election of friendly or 
at least nonbelligerent governors and Solons.17 
The emergence of the Ring in state politics add.ed 
the one-sided elements of that strong organization to the 
one-party system and. swelled the Ring's influence within 
the state. The common tactic of 11 back-scratching11 t>Tas 
often employed by the Ring to develop a rural-parish vote 
to back its own bills. The Ring would back certain rural-
parish measures not affecting Orleans Parish interests in 
16 
Reynold.s , .Q.E.• cit., pp . 19-21. 
17 
Ibid., pp. 23-41. 
21 
order to secure adequate backing for its measures. Rural 
Solons, in order to gain Ring favor, often exempted Orleans 
from coverage by amending their bills with what came to be 
a common phrase in the LoUisiana Legislature, "parish of 
Orleans exceptea..n18 
Asid.e from directing the operations of the Crescent 
City's legislative delegation, the Ring backed slates of 
cand.idates in all elections of interest to the voters of 
New Orleans. The organization never openly enrolled a 
gubernatorial aspirant of its own or endorsed. one early in 
a campaign. Usually, after a period of careful study, the 
Ring would quietly secure the necessary 11 und.erstand.ings" 
with the candidate who was not hostile to it and seemed 
to have the best prospects of carrying a plurality of votes 
in the rural parishes.19 After making these "arrangements, 11 
the Ring would. publicly voice its sponsorship, occasionlly 
as late as the night before the election. 20 
Oil eventually dwarfed the gas and. electric, lumber, 
planter, and. railroad. factions which constituted. a large 
18 
Ibid.., PP• 38-39· 
19 I.E.!£·. p. 40. 
20 
T. Harry Williams, Romance and Realism in Southern 
Politics (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1901), p. 67. 
22 
segment of the New Orleans Ring . Accordingly , in the early 
1920 1 s the Stand.ard. Oil Company became a major political 
and economic factor in Lou1siana . 21 
The Ring and Standard Oil Company usually emerged as 
the victors in the running battle between New Orleans and 
the rural parishes . 22 Ring rule moved Louisiana into a 
civic vacuum and the "safe" policies of the organization 
developed a reservoir of dissatisfaction from which Huey 
Long was to later dxaw much support . 23 
21 
Ibid .• 
22From 1900 to 1924 , the Ring backed the successful 
gubernatorial candid.acies of Heard , Blanchard , Sand.ers, 
Pleasant, and Fuqua . 
23 
Cf ., V. O. Key , Jr ., Southern Politics in State 
~Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf , 1961) , pp:-159-60 . 
CHAPTER III 
THE FLEDGLING KINGFISH 
There is an obvious relationship between Huey Long's 
environment and. his political philosophy. The program that 
he advocated. was, in many respects, a twentieth century 
version of traditional Louisiana Populism.1 However, it 
is of significance that during his entire political career 
he never seriously mentioned the two great southern 
legends: the Old South and the Lost Cause. In an era when 
many politicians attempted to recall the images of past 
glories, Huey Long spoke of the economic realities of the 
present and. the future. 2 
Huey Pierce Long, Jr., was born on August 30, 1893, 
in a "comfortable, well-built, four-room log house," the 
eighth of nine children, in the small town of Winnfield, 
Winn Parish, in north-central Louisiana.3 Huey's father 
cultivated a portion of a 320 acre tract of soil suitable 
1 
v. o. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and 
Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950}, P: 157. ---
2 T. Harry Williams, Romance and Realism in Southern 
Politics (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1961}, pp. 
68-69. 
3auey P. Long, Every ~ ~ King: The Autobiography 
2f Huey P. Long (New Orleans: National Book Company, 1933), 
P• 2. 
only for subsistence farming , though it was in danger of a 
second. growth of loblolly pine . Winn Parish was mean poor 
and populated. mainly by Protestant small farmers . Social 
opportunities , according to Long, were largely limited to 
participation in Baptist revivals and 11 attending every 
funeral within ten miles . u4 
In 1900, the Arkansas Southern Railroad. constructed. 
a small lumber line from El Dorado , Arkansas , to Winnfield 
and located the depot on the Long farm . The temporary 
prosperity of the sawmills soon brought other lines into 
the area, swelling the population of Winnfield. to almost 
three thousand persons . One sid.e of the Long tract became 
the site of the business district and another portion was 
developed into a residential area . 
There is a myth about the background of Huey Long 
that tints almost everything that has been written about 
him. That myth pictures him as a 11red.neck," without 
ed.ucation or culture; in the language of the South, 11whi te 
trash . 11 5 The Longs were , however, highly respectful of 
ed.ucation and. eager to acquire it . With the financial 
security brought by land. sales, each of the Long children 
4 
Ibid., PP • 6-7 • 
5 Williams, 2E• cit . , p . 68 . 
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6 
was able to acquire at least a sampling of college life . 
After completion of high school , the young Kingfish 
traveled through north Louisiana selling Cottolene, a lard 
substitute for kitchen use . The ambitious young politico 
never stayed in hotels while on selling trips . Long said: 
I always drove out beyond. town to a farmhouse where 
they 1 d. put me up • • • and later I would. make it my 
business to drop those folks a post card so they'd be 
sure to remember me . 7 
After sales positions in Kansas City, Houston, 
Memphis , and Oklahoma City, Long enrolled in the Oklahoma 
State University Law School in 1912. His stay was notable 
only for its political turbulence . Flouting a campus-
organized Wilson-for-President Club, Long announced in 
25 
favor of Champ Clark and staged a walkout when the original 
club held its meeting . Long's organization unanimously 
endorsed Clark. As a result of this mild adventure , Long 
d.eveloped. a tactic he would later employ for higher stakes . 
His dictum: "In a political fight, when you have nothing 
in favor of your sid.e, start a row in the opposi tion . n8 
6 
The Long family produced. three d.octors and two 
lawyers . 
7 Quoted. by Hermann B. Deutsch, The Huey Long 
Murder Case (Garden City, New York: Doubled.ay and Company, 
Inc . , 1903), p . 14 . 
8 Quoted in Thomas Martin , Dynasty: The yongs of 
Louisiana (New York: G. P. Putnam' s Sons, 1960 , p. 27. 
In 1914 Huey married. Rose McConnell of Shreveport. 
The couple settled in a two-room apartment in New Orleans 
and. in October of that year the young bridegroom entered. 
Tulane University as a student of law. Huey was faced. 
with the alternative of becoming a lawyer very qUickly or 
of abandoning the effort entirely when his finances ran 
low in the late months of spring. However, he petitioned 
Chief Justice Frank A. Monroe of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court to assemble the majority of the Court necessary to 
give the qualifying examination. On May 15, 1915, Huey 
Long, at twenty-one, was licensed. to practice law.9 
A few days after passing the bar examination, Long 
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returned. to Winnfield to a four-dollar-a-month rented. office 
to begin practice. The clients, though, were few and. the 
first month's rent was paid. with a 11 hot 11 check. Slowly 
the clients drifted in and Huey developed what he called 
10 
a 11 chip and whetstone" practice. 
Most of the early cases came from the railroad 
yards--workmen's compensation and injury suits. But Huey's 
first major political contact came when a widow asked him 
to sue the Bank of Winnfield. for money she thought that 
9 Long, 22• cit., pp. 9-17. 
10 
Ibid., p. 22. 
the bank owed her. Although neither he nor the widow had 
the one hundred dollars for the required legal bond, Huey 
took the case. With characteristic swagger Huey went to 
the bank, sought out one of the d.irectors, State Senator 
J, S. Harper, and. persuaded him to post the necessary 
bond so that the bank could be sued .• 11 
A few months after the d.eclaration of war with 
Germany, the same Senator Harper published a pamphlet, 
"Issues of the Day--Freed.om of Speech--Financial Slavery, 11 
in which he advocated the taxing of wealth for war costs 
instead. of issuing bonds. In the first month of 1918, a 
Fed.eral Grand Jury in Alexandria, Louisiana, issued. an 
indictment against Harper for violation of the Espionage 
Act. 
27 
The attorneys for the d.efense were the brothers Huey 
and Julius Long. During the course of the trial, in a 
New Orleans Times-Picayune interview, Huey revealed. his 
12 
careful examination and acceptance of the Harper thesis. 
The case dragged. to tiresome lengths, but upon the close 
of evidence, Julius Long presented. a well-constructed. 
argument for the defense and. the Senator was acqui ted.. 
11 
Ibid., PP• 23-25. 
12News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
February 22, 1918. 
The Harper trial catapulted twenty-four year old 
Huey P. Long into the Louisiana limelight. In a letter to 
the New Orleans ~. a few days after the trial, Huey set 
forth to the people of the Pelican State the earliest 
indication of his political philosophy: 
28 
A conservative estimate is that about sixty-five or 
seventy per cent of the entire wealth of the United 
States is owned by two per cent of the people. Sixty-
eight per cent of the whole people living in the United 
States own but two per cent of its wealth. From the 
year 1890 to 1910, the wealth of this nation trebled, 
yet the masses owned less in 1910 than they did. in 1890 
and a greater per cent of the people lived. in rented 
and mortgaged homes in 1910 than did in 1900. Reports 
from the Committee of Industral Relations, appointed 
by the Presiclent [Wilson], showed that wealth 1s fast 
concentrating in the hand.s of a few. 
But the greatest cause for industrial unrest is that 
of education. Authorities on education tell us that 
eighty out of every one hund.red. people in the United. 
States never enter high school; only fourteen out of 
every thousand gets a college education; 690 out of 
every thousand never finish the fourth grade in school. 
Does such a condition give~e ordinary man hls proper 
return of the nation's wealth? What d.o you think 
of such a game of life so brutally and cruelly unfair, 
with the dice so loaded that the child of tod.ay must 
enter it with only fourteen chances out of a thousand 
in his favor of getting a college education and. with 
986 chances against securing the lucky d~aw? How can 
this nation prosper with the ord.inary child having only 
twenty chances in a thousand. of securing the first part 
of the game? 
This is the condition, north east, south, and west; 
with wealth concentrating, classes becoming defined., 
there is little opportunity for Christian uplift and. 
education and. cannot be until there is more economic 
reform. This is the problem that the good people of 
this country must consider.13 
At twenty-four, Huey Long possessed a political 
platform. Without serious modification, but with sophis-
ticated enlargements, the creeds of "Every Man a King" and. 
"Share Our Wealth" were roughly outlined in his letter on 
the concentration of wealth. 
29 
Long sought the one state office then open to one of 
his age and north LoUisiana residence: Third District 
14 Railroad Commissioner. As a political unknown, Long had 
few supporters and little influence, and competed with 
three others in an attempt to unseat the popular incumbent, 
Burk A. Bridges, who was running for re-election. 
The campaign the fledgling Kingfish waged for the 
seat on the Commission, in the summer of 1918, set the 
pattern for Long's future campaigns. From his headquarters 
in Shreveport, Long mailed thousands of envelopes, each 
containing four circulars, to almost every voter in the 
Third District. They were, naturally, partisan and slanted., 
but they were lengthy compositions--an average product ran 
from 1, 000 to 1, 800 words--and. they were packed with 
l3Letter to the F.Cli tor in the New Orleans Item, 
March 1, 1918. ----
14The Constitution of 1898 prescribed no minimum 
age qualification for the office of Railroad. Commissioner. 
political and economic information . 15 
Instead of aping the 11 rednecks" by wearing overalls 
and. riding in a wagon , Long, d.ressed in a smart business 
suit and driving an automobile , stumpted in areas long 
ignored. by office- seekers . Accustomed. to recounts of the 
Old South and. the Lost Cause , the farmers of the Third. 
District were confronted. with a man who told. them to fight 
for what they wanted. . Long later recalled.: 
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I canvassed the farmers in person and spent most of 
my time at night tacking up my campaign posters in the 
neighborhood being canvassed . Occasionally, so intense 
was my campaign, I called people from their beds at all 
hours of the night to talk politics . 
Nothing in my campaign seemed to please farmers more 
or cause them to recollect me near1!6so favorably as to call them from their beds at night . 
Long secured. 55', 515 votes to Bridges 1 6 , 979 votes in 
the first primary and. attracted a majority of the votes in 
eight of the twenty-eight parishes in the district . In the 
runoff , Huey won by 635 votes (7 , 286 to 6,651) . 
The six-year office gave Long a respectable platform 
from which to launch his program . He bombarded friends and. 
the newspapers with circulars which outlined in d.etail the 
injustices in the state's handling of corporate interests , 
15The best collection of Long material is in the 
Tulane University Library in New Orleans , LoUisiana . 
16 
Long, 2R• cit . , pp . 40-~·1 . 
in particular, Standard Oi1 Company, the dominant vested 
interest in the state. 
Standard Oi1 had S1lmmari1y moved to put more than 
31 
one hundred independent oil companies out of business by 
d.enying them the use of the Standard-owned pipelines, 
necessary to carry their crude oil from the field to the 
refineries. Long countered with an ingenuity and initiative 
characteristic of his entire public career. He persuaded 
Shelby M. Taylor, Chairman of the Railroad Commission, to 
endorse his view that pipelines were common carriers and, 
therefore, subject to regulation by the Commission. The 
attempt by Standard Oil to have the ruling reversed by the 
courts was tmsuccessfu1.17 
Having secured statewid.e fame through his tilts 
with Standard Oil and Governor Parker, 18 Huey further 
enhanced his politically useful record with a series of 
successful rate cases. The Public Service Commission, 19 
17Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Standard 
Q!! Companies Qf Louisiana, 154 Louisiana Reports, P• 557• 
l8A public statement reflecting unmistakably on the 
Governor's ancestry resulted in a libel suit against Long. 
Huey received. a suspended sentence and a one dollar fine. 
Long refused to pay the fine. 
19The Constitution of 1921 created the Public 
Service Commission to replace the Railroad Commission in 
regulation of public utilities. 
as a result of hearings held. in 1920-21, had granted the 
Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Company a twenty per 
cent rate increase. In 1922, Huey Long, then Chairman of 
the Public Service Commission, 20 reopened the case. The 
rates were eventually lowered., and since the red.uctions 
1·1ere made retroactive to the time of Cumberland 1 s 1920 
application for increase, a huge reftmd. was assured. to all 
telephone subscribers. 21 Overnight the Kingfish was a 
state hero. He scored on other fronts as well, lowering 
the rates on the Southwestern Gas and. Electric Company, 
of all intrastate railroads, and. of the Shreveport street-
22 
cars. 
By the election year of 192.3, Huey Long was a 
personal force in state politics, assured of support if 
he should decide to "make the race for governor. 112.3 On 
20In November of 1921., Chairman John Hichael died., 
and. Francis vl1lliams was elected to succeed him. Huey 
Long became chairman in 1922. 
21 Cumberland Telephone and Tele~raph Company v. 
Louisiana Public Service Commission, 2 .3 Federal Reporter, 
p. 265: Cumberland. Telephone and. Telegraph Company v. 
Louisiana Public Service Commission, 260 u. s. 212 . 
22 
Huey P . Long v . Ci t;y s>J.'. Shreveport anc1. Shreveport 
Railroad Company, 151 Louisiana Reports , p . 42). 
2
.3News item in the New Orleans Item-Tribune, 
January 6, 192.3. 
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his thirtieth birthd.ay, 24 following eight months of vague 
utterances, Long dispelled all doubts when he filed. for the 
highest elective state office. 25 In a speech delivered. in 
Shreveport, Huey set forth a broad. program: a vast highway 
construction program, the establishment of criminal courts 
of appeal, state warehouses for farm produce, natural gas 
for New Orleans, an increase in the number of schools, state 
26 
supplied. textbooks, and. the taxation of Stand.ard 011 on a 
one-hundred-cent dollar.27 
In terms of organization and political support Huey 
placed a poor third. behind. his two rivals in the campaign 
of 1924. Henry L. Fuqua, the former manager of Angola 
State Penitentiary, was backed by the "old." Ring, the Ku 
Klux Klan, and. former Governor J. Y. Sanders. Fiercely 
anti-Klan, Hewitt L. Bouanchard., the Catholic Lieutenant-
Governor under Parker, was supported by the Times-Picayune 
and. the Crescent City's 11 new11 Ring , a splinter group 
2l~ Under the Constitution of 1921, thirty was the 
minimum age for a gubernatorial cand.id.ate. 
25News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
August 31, 1923. 
26 
News item in the Shreveport Times, September 2, 
1923. 
27 Nel'lS items in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
September 7, 8, 19; and. December 19, 1923. 
backeo. by Colonel John Sullivan , Colonel John Ewing, the 
publisher of the Shreveport Times , and his son Robert , 
publisher of the Baton Rouge States . 
34 
The campaign took on a strange appearance in October 
of 1923 when the Governor voiced his support of the Catholic 
Bouanchaud , stating that the "great issue is Klan and anti-
Klan.n 28 Long, who claimed membership only in the Elks, 29 
appealed to the voters to ignore the religious issues and 
continued to speak for those things he considereo. to be 
paramotm.t. 30 However, the south LoUisiana vote appeared 
lost l'lhen Swords R. Lee , a prominent Klan leader, spoke 
out in favor of his nephew--Huey Long . 31 
Huey , in the tradition of politics , forecasted 
victory, barring rain , which would 11mud- out 11 his backwoods 
voters . He realized , however , that the state was divideo. 
by a religious conflict which left him out of the running 
28 News items in the Nel'1 Orleans Times- Picayune , 
October 28 ana 30 , 1923 . 
29Nel'lS item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune , 
August 31 , 1923 . 
30News items in the New Orleans Times- Picayune , 
September 7, 18 , 19; October 6; and. December 19 , 1923 . 
31News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
December 19, 1923. 
in many places.32 
The January primary placed Fuqua and Bouanchaud in 
the runoff, as shown in these results: 33 
Orleans Other State %State 
Long 12,187 61,798 73.985 30.9 
Fuqua 33,194 48,188 81,382 34.0 
Bouanchaud 23,300 60,862 84,162 35.1 
Total 68,681 170,848 239.329 
35 
"On the night preced.ing the election, a heavy down-
pour of rain fell in every part of the state.u34 Huey's 
defeat, however, was not caused only, or even mainly, by 
muddy roads.35 Huey , a Baptist uplander, from the region 
of greatest Klan power, had attempted to straddle the 
issue and thereby gained the judgment of many that he was 
a Klan candid.ate. In the first primary a d.istinct sectional 
32wng, .Q.E • ill•, P • 77 • 
33computed from Compilation 2! Primary Election 
Returns of the Democratic Party, State of Louisiana, held 
January 13,"'"'1924. -
J4Long, ~· cit., pp. 77-78. 
35c.r., stan Optowsky, The Longs of LoUisiana (New 
York: E. P. Dutton and Company:-Inc., 19bO}, p. 41; and. 
Reinhard B. Luthin, American Demagogues: Twentieth Century 
(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, l959), P• 244. 
voting pattern was evid.ent . Basically, south Louisiana 
had voted for the Catholic Bouanchaud , while Long and. Fuqua 
had. fought for north Louisiana and. the Florida parishes . 
For the most part , the state vote- pattern did not repeat 
that of 1896, nor did. it forecast the Long victory of 1928 . 
The basic reasons for Huey ' s defeat , therefore , lay in the 
realm of religion , rather than class , issues in the 
campaign , together with the fact that two Protestants were 
running against one Catholic . 36 It was only due to Fuqua 's 
strength in New Orleans [Orleans Parish] that he, instead. 
of Long was in the runoff . 
In the runoff held February 19 , 1923 , although Long 
refused. to endorse either candidate , the bulk of his rural 
vote went to Fuqua , who received. 57 .8 per cent of the total 
vote cast . 37 
The lesson of the 192l.J· campaign was obvious to Long 
and. the array of opportunists who came over to his side 
d.uring the next three years . If he could keep the north 
LoUisiana hill-parish following and. make alliances in the 
Crescent City and. south LoUisiana , his election in 1928 
36 I1artin , .Ql?.. cit . , p . l.J.o. 
37computed. from Compilation of Primary Election 
Returns of the Democratic Party, State of Louisiana , held. 
February 1'9 :-I 92Lt. . -
37 
would. be guaranteea. . 38 
Long ~Tas renominated as Third District member of the 
Public Service Commission in September, 1924 . He polled 
83 . 9 per cent of the total vote cast and carried all twenty-
eight of the parishes in that north Louisiana district . In 
the same primary, Huey supported. the renomination of United 
States Senator Joseph E. Ransd.ell , a south Louisiana 
Catholic , l'Tho d.efeated. L. E. Thomas , Mayor of Shreveport . 
In the New Orleans mayorality primary of 1925, Huey joined. 
the Colonel Sullivan ' s 11nel'T11 Ring in support of Paul H. 
Haloney against Hartin Behrman. 39 Perceptive Behrmanites 
charged. that Maloney was being backed. 11 to make Huey Long 
governor in 1928 . .. 40 
Long's chance to l'Tin converts in the south came in 
the 1926 Senatorial campaign when he backed. the incumbent , 
a south Louisiana Catholic 11wet , 11 Edwin s . Broussard . The 
38Leo Glenn Douthit , "The Governorship of Huey P. 
Long" (unpublished Master ' s thesis , Tulane University , New 
Orleans , 19L~7) , p . 37 . 
3911artin Berhman, mayor of New Orleans for twenty-
four years , died shortly after taking office , in 1925, and. 
~ras succeed. by Maloney. 
40 Hermann B. Deutsch , "The Kingoom of the Kingfish," 
New Orleans Item , August 6 , 1939 . 
41 Senator was opposed by a Ring 11l'Tarhorse , " Jared. Y. 
Sanders, an east Louisiana Protestant 11dry, 11 with reputed. 
strength in north Louisiana .4 2 For twenty- one days Long 
38 
stumpted in all parts of the state for "Cousin Ed., 11 making 
four to six speeches per d.ay . To keep from alienating his 
own upland supporters , Huey ducked. the prohibition question 
and. centered his attack on Sander 1 s advocacy of toll bridges 
for the New Orleans area.43 The Senator was re- elected. by 
44 
a slender margin , and Huey claimed credit for saving the 
Broussard. election . 45 However , it was the narrowness of the 
victory, rather than the high degree of support accorded him 
by those north Louisiana parishes loyal to Long in 1924, 
that allowed Huey to accent his contributuion to the: outcome. 
41 The Ri ng was avidly "wet . 11 News item in the New 
Orleans Times- Picayune , August 9, 1926. 
4·2 Long, QE• cit ., p . 82 . 
43sanders had supported Act 1h1 of 1924 which adopted. 
a toll bridge policy for the state highway system. On 
Febr~~y 26 , 1925 , in negotiations between the Highway 
Commission and. the Pontchartrain Bridge Company, to whom the 
franchise was granted. , the company was represented by Jared. 
Y. Sanders . 
44The official returns showed Broussard l'ri th 84·, 041 
votes and. Sanders with 80 , 562 . 
4·5 Long, QE• cit ., p . 83 . 
• 
39 
\'lhile Long worked to extend. his influence by his own 
efforts, the Fuqua administration indirectly helped his 
chances for the 1928 gubernatorial election. By enacting 
three anti-Klan measures, the Louisiana Legislature put an 
end to the religious issues which confined. Long's appeal 
to north Louisiana in 1924·. On the other hand., Governor 
Henry Fuqua died on October 11, 1929, a short time after 
the Senatorial campaigns. He was succeeded. by Lieutenant-
Governor o. H. Simpson, who had also supported the re-
election of Broussard . Shortly after assuming office, 
Simpson, who had gubernatorial ambitions which rivaled those 
of Huey , stole Long's thunder when he announced. a free-
bridge policy and let contracts for the construction of 
piers upon which free bridges could be rested . 46 
In the 1928 gubernatorial campaign, neither of Long's 
two opponents, singly, represented. a threat to the 
Kingfish's chances of victory. Governor Simpson was the 
first to announce his entrance into the gubernatorial 
race.
47 Two days later, Congressman Riley J. Wilson , 
poll tical ally of former Governor Jared. Y. Sanders, was 
46 Long, 2E• cit., PP • 90-93· 
47 
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
July 6, 1927. 
I 40 
nominated. at an Alexandria political rally . 48 
The main concern to the Kingfish was the likelihood. 
that his opponents would. join forces s o that , if he failed. 
to secure a majority over both in the first primary, "common 
cause would. be made by both the Wilson and. Simpson forces 
behind. whichever cand.id.ate was in the second. contest .u49 
To counter the threat of this alliance , Huey employed. his 
11 start a row in the opposition" tactic . As Long record.ed. 
in his autobiography , he found. 
some traitor in our camp who was willing to go to the 
Simpson crowd. and. ad.vise them that this other gang 
[Wilson] was working to ruin their cand.id.ate .50 
The tactic was employed. so effectively that any 
possibility of co-operation between his rivals was not 
likely . Long poured all the oil on the fire that he could , 
w·ith excellent results . 51 He d.ismissed. ~lilson's 11 flood 
record 11 with rid.icule : 11 Wilson has been in the Congress 
fourteen years , and this year [1927] the water went 
fourteen feet higher than ever , 11 which , according to 
Kingfish Long , gave him a flood record. on the basis of one 
48 News item in the New Orleans Times- Picayune , 
July 9 . 1927. 
49Long , ~· cit ., p . 101 . 
50 
Ibid , , p . 102 . 
51 Ibid . 
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foot of high 1t1ater a year . 52 Governor Simpson was assaulted 
for his alleged. padding of the ranks of the Conservation 
Commission , 11 a coon- chasin ' an 1 possum- watchin ' brigade , 
that does its job cruising around in a fancy boat in the 
Gulf . u53 
Long, the last to file in the race , 54 opened his 
gubernatorial campaign in the hostile city of Alexandria . 
Under the banner 11 EVEB.Y MAN A KING , BUT NO HAN WEARS A 
CROHN 11 Huey and. his running mate , Dr . Paul Cyr ,55 presented 
their platform: free textbooks; free bridges; permanent all-
weather roads ; natural gas for larger towns and. cities; 
development of inland waterways; vocational training for 
the deaf , dumb, and blind; and. enactment of an occupational 
tax on Standard Oil Company . 56 
The Kingfish 1 s campaign was probably unequaled in 
52 Quoted by !1artin, .QJ2. • cit ., p . 41 . 
53Quoted by Harnett T. Kane , Louisiana Hayride: The 
American Rehersal for Dictatorship , 1928-19~·0 (New York:--
William Horrow andCOmpany, 19h1) , p . 56 . 
51.{· 
News item in the New Orleans Times - Picayune , July 
6, 1927. 
55nr . Paul Cyr , a denist of Jeanerette , was a Creole 
Catholic who had. been on the Bouanchaud ticket in 1924 . 
56News item in~ Shreveport Times , August 4 , 1927; 
and Long, .Q!?.• cit . , pp . 97-98 . 
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Louisiana ' s political history. 11His meetings were a cross 
between a New Orleans carnival parade , a revival meeting, 
and. a Saturday sandlot baseball game .u57 Huey stumpted. in 
remote places that had never seen a gubernatorial contender 
and. made speeches on a schedule that amazed. his opponents . 
As his greatest strength lay in the rural sections , it was 
to them that he directed. his campaign . 
Huey 1 s melodramatic speech to a Cajun audience 
projected. the campaign of 1928 into the realm of class 
struggle within LoUisiana . His attacks and. promises fused 
in an emotional appeal to the lower- class whites and Negroes 
to 11kickout the old. gang" and corporations : 
And it is here und.er this oak where Evangeline 
waited. for her lover , Gabriel, who never came . This 
oak is an immortal spot , mad.e so by Longfellow • s poem, 
but Evangeline is not the only one who has waited here 
in disappointment . 
Where are the schools that you have waited. for your 
child~en to have , that have never come? Where are the 
roads and highways that you sent your money to build, 
and. are no nearer now than ever before? Where are 
the institutions to care for the sick and disabled? 
Evangeline wept bitter tears in her disappointment , but 
it lasted. through only one lifetime. Your tears have 
lasted for generations . Give me a chance to dry the 
eyes of those who still weep here . 58 
57Kane , 212.• cit ., p . 56 . 
58Long , Q.E• Cit., P • 99 • 
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Huey's victory in the January primary was of a 
personal nature. Long carried, with him into office only 
Lieutenant-Governor Paul Cyr and. Treasurer H. B. Conner. 
There were one hundred members in the House of Representa-
tives and thirty-nine members of the Senate . The Kingfish, 
in his autobiography, reported that only eighteen members 
I 
of the House and nine members of the Senate had. supported. 
his gubernatorial candidacy.59 
The January primary placed. Long and \-Ti lson in the 
runoff, as shown in these results : 60 
Orleans Other State % State 
Long 17, 819 109,023 126,842 43 . 9 
Wilson 38 , 24·Lf. 43 , 503 81 , 747 28 .3 
Simpson 22 , 387 58 ,002 80,326 27 . 8 
Total 78,387 210,528 288 , 915 
Simpson and 1tl1lson , ho1-rever , both wi thd.rew from the 
race , eliminating the need. for a runoff , and. Long was 
nominated. as the Democratic candidate for governor. 
A comparison of the vote- pattern in Figure 2 , page 16, 
59 Long, QE• £!!• P• 107. 
60computed. from Compilation of Primary Election 
Returns of the Democratic Party, State of Louisiana, held 
January 17, 1928. -
FIGURE 3 . 
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and Figure 3, page 44 , will support the thesis of a class 
struggle continuing in Louisiana. In 1928 , Long held the 
45 
northern uplands and attracted only a six per cent increase 
in the New Orleans vote over that of 1924 . The increase in 
strength came largely from the backing afforded. him by the 
many small- farmer areas of south Louisiana . The termination 
of the Ku Klux Klan issue , coupled with Long ' s 11politicking11 
from 1924 to 1927, had allowed class appeal to overcome the 
sectionalism based on religious differences . 61 The class 
62 
revolution of 1928 had its basis in Louisiana ' s past . 
But the hopes of the "old gang , " the urban-planter alliance , 
Standard. Oil , and. others that the latest class movement 
would also be abortive were short lived . 
61 Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long ' s Louisiana: State 
Politics , 1120-1952 (Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University 
Press , 1959 , P • 55 . 
62 
Carlton Beals , The Story 2[ Huey f • yang 
(Philad.elphia : v. B. Lippencott Company, 1935 , pp . 21-27 . 
CHAPTER IV 
THE FIRST EIGHT MONTHS: INAUGURATION TO IMPEACHMENT 
Huey Long promised. big changes in both of his 
campaigns. "He promised big, partly because that was his 
natm·e and partly because a big promised that took in the 
interests of a large number of people was good strategy.u1 
However, it seemed. doubtful to supportez·s, opponents, and 
disinterested. observers that he would be successful. The 
Kingfish met unreasoning and unscruplous resistence from 
the "old. gang.u The announcement of his principle demands 
in 1928 led to an attempt in the next year to impeach him. 
The impeachment unmistakably hardened Long, and the tactics 
of the opposition and. his own tactics to overcome theirs 
induced in him a measure of cynicism about the democratic 
process. According to Key, however, the Kingfish 
is not to be dismissed. as a mere rabble-rouser or as a 
leader of a gang of bood.lers. Nor can he be deseri bed 
by convenient label: fascist, communist. He brought to 
his career a streak of genius, yet 1n his program and. 
tactics he lias ind.igenous to Louisiana as pine trees 
and petroleum.2 
The Governor-elect did. not wait for inauguration to 
1 T. Barry Williams, Romance and Realism in Southern 
Polities (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1961), P• ?6. 
2 v. o. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State ~ 
Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), P7 15?· 
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launch his program. As recorded in his autobiography, Long 
asked. Governor Simpson 11 to begin opex·ation of free ferries 
parallel to the toll brid.ges immed.iately.113 
The Louisiana Legislature met in the Capitol at 
Baton Rouge on May 14, 1928, one week before Huey Long's 
inauguration. By an arrangement reached between his forces 
and those elected on the Simpson ticket, the Kingfish was 
able to have his captains, John B. Fournet and Philip H. 
Gilbert, elected Speaker of the House and President Pro 
Tempore, respectively.4 
On May 21, 1928, in the doubtless apocryphal 
inaugural ad.dress, Long stated: 
If in the course of the next four years I shall 
have been able to protect, safeguard and advance the 
interests of the same state, to harmonize and coordinate 
our forces of labor and industry, agriculture and 
commerce. • • • Then, I , in pride of my accomplish-
ment, regard.less of whom I may please or offend, can 
write "finis" to the political career ••• • :::> 
The K1ngf1sh's unexpected 1n1t1al success before 
the inauguration was a signal for bolder and more far-
3auey P. Long, Every Han ~ K1nf: ~ Autobiography 
2!. Huey ~· Long {New Orleans: Nat1ona Book Company, 1933), 
P• 109. 
4 Louisiana House Journal, 1928 {Baton Rouge: 1928), 
pp. 4-S; Louisiana Senate Journal, 1928 {Baton Rouge: 1928), 
and Long, ~· ill·, p. 109-11. 
s The full text of the address is in the New Orleans 
Times-Picayune, May 22, 1928. 
reaching operations afterwards. The Governor proposed, 
what he termed, "legislation to strengthen the hand of the 
administration." 6 In his attempt to break the New Orleans 
bloc, Long organized. the Legislature by "personally 
dictating"? all committee appointments.8 
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Two weeks after the election, Long delivered a 
broadside against the New Orleans Ring. The Democratic 
State Committee assembled in the crescent City in February 
to call a convention to select representatives for the 
Democratic National Convention. The choice was usually 
based upon the strength of the factions 1n the Legislature. 
where Long was weak and where the Ring held a sizable bloc. 
Long and a political ally, Harvey G. Fields, the Committee 
Chairman, found that the Constitution of 1921 did not 
specifically call for a convention. They had the State 
Committee itself name the d.elegation. A Longite slate 
was selected., omitting representatives of the New Orleans 
machine and the urban-planter allainoe.9 
6 
Long, ~· ill•, P• 109. 
7 Hermann B. Deustoh, "Kingdom of the K1ngfish, •• 
New Orleans Item, August 10, 1939, p. 12a. 
8 LoUisiana House Journal, 1928, PP• 13-15. 
9 Deustoh, 2R• ~ •• p. 13a. 
The Governor's two major goals were to secure the 
state's patronage by securing control of the various 
boards and to sucessfully launch his program of legislation 
to fulfill his campaign promises. Long's impatient efforts 
led him to violate the usual precedents and proprities of 
the office. He invaded the floor of the House and the 
Senate to line up backing for his bills and hastened pro-
cedures by giving instructions to his supporters.10 With 
the help of the Simpson-ticket forces he managed to muster 
a majority in the Legislature. although they did not align 
with him on all occasions. At times. threats of desertion 
caused him to avoid combat on an issue he favored and at 
other times actual desertion caused bills to die. 
Despite his maneuvering, constant bickering and a 
mass of bills introduced by the opposition forces clogged 
the legislative calendar and made it impossible to force 
consideration on Long's important proposals. The Kingfish 
finally evaded the delimmas he had the administration floor 
leaders move for first passage on every bill as fast as its 
number appeared. The calendar was cleared in a few hours, 
while the opposition watched helplessly. "I later," Long 
10 News item in the ~ York_Times, July 19, 1928. 
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wrote, 11vetoed. the objectionable bills by the score.n 11 
To fulfill his campaign pledges it was necessary for 
Long to develop sources of strong financial backing. To 
raise money for the institutions for the deaf, dumb, and 
blind, the charity hospital, and the public schools, the 
Governor proposed a carbon black12 tax of four cents per 
pound.13 The free textbooks were to be provided by an 
increase 1n the severance tax on such natural resources as 
14 lumber, salt, gas. and. oil. Another bill provided for 
a constitutional amendment. to be submitted. to the voters. 
for doubling the two-cent tax on gasoline. The new tax-
rate would make possible the retirement of a bond issue 
of $30,000,000 which was earmarked for hardsurfacing of 
highways and the construction of free bridges.15 
The legislation met with a vast amount of entrenched 
opposition. The carbon black and oil interests voiced 
11 
Louisiana House Journal, 1928, pp. 529-82. 
12 Carbon black was made by wastefully burning 
natural gas against tin. 
13 Louisiana House Journal, 1928, pp. 446-47. 
14 
Louisiana House Journal, 1928, pp. 352-53. 412. 
15 
~· 
strong opposition to the proposal affecting them.16 As 
Long recorded in his autobiography: 
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The demonstration staged by the friends of the 
Standard Oil Company and its allies against the 
additional tax on oil resulted in a frenzied session 
••• [withl the combined opposition of the public 
press, of the chambers of commerce and boards of tr!~e, 
aid.ed about the cause by the corporation lobbyists. 
In spite of the fierce opposition, Long scored a 
limited success on the plan for a four-cent tax on carbon 
black. The clash was so strong that the tax was reduced 
to one-half a cent per pound, even though many doubted that 
the revenues would be sufficient.18 
Another of Governor Long's major accomplishments 
in the 1928 regular legislative session was the enactment 
of the free textbook law. The necessary funds were 
supplied by an increase in the severance tax on natural 
resources based on the quantity-of-product severed, rather 
than upon value, as under existing law. Although the 
Constitution of 1921 expressly prohibited. state aid to 
"private or sectarian schools," Long's plan was designed. 
to make all elementary and high school students--in private, 
public, and parochial schools--the beneficiaries of free 
1~ane, 2£• ill·, P• 65 
17Long, ~· ill•, P• 111. 
18Louisiana House Journal, 1928, PP• 446-47. 
textbooks. With characteristic originality, the Kingrish 
ducked the 1921 constitutional prohibition by adopting the 
argument that the state was supplying the textbooks to the 
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students, not the schools, and was merely using the schools 
as convenient distribution centers.19 The law was at once 
taken to the courts, but in a ruling of national importance, 
20 the United States Supreme Court upheld the textbook law. 
While it may be properly observed that the free text-
book law was politically wise and used to cement the loyalty 
or many south Louisiana Catholics to Longism, 21 it must 
also be observed that the law was a basic element in the 
Long philosophy. In his "concentration of wealth" letter 
Long stated that the "greatest cause ror ind.ustrial unrest 
was that of education.1122 When the K1ngfish took office 
LoUisiana ranked first among the states in the percentage of 
illiterates within the populat1on.23 As late as 1940, after 
281 u. 
19LoU1siana House Journal, 1928, pp. 412-13. 
20 Cochran v. Louisiana State Board 2!. Education, 
s. 370 (1930). 
21 
Sindler, ~· ~·· p. 59· 
22 c.f. ante, p. 28. 
23 Computed from the United States Bureau of the 
Census, Fifteenth Census 2!. ~ Un1 ted States: !.2.lQ.. 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935). 
Among Long's more successful measures was a bill 
which provided for a constitutional amendment, to be 
submitted to the voters, for the increase in the gasoline 
tax. It was attacked because it was said that there was 
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no guarantee that the funds, which were to be expended in 
highway and bridge construction, would not merely be used 
to increase the payroll of the Highway Commission for 
political purposes. Others declared that the proposal was 
extravagant and that the state was unable to assume such a 
financial burden. The bill was passed after a lengthy 
discussion, partly because many Solons believed that the 
voters would not approve the tax increase.JO Another 
administration bill which authorized a $15,000,000 bond 
issue for the building of seawalls on the shore of Lake 
Pontchartrain at New Orleans, also won a majority.Jl 
Long's objective of gaining control of the major 
patronage of the state also met with success. His first 
official act as governor had been to appoint new members to 
the contract-letting Highway Commission, which was already 
under control of the executive department. The new chair-
JOLoUlsiana House Journal, 1928, PP• 188-89, 412-
lJ; and the~~ Times, July 19, 1928. 
31Acts, State 2f. Louis!.!!!!, 1928, pp • .34-42. 
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man was Long 1 s W1nn Parish neighbor, Oscar Kelly "OK" 
Allen.J2 As promised during the campaign, an investigation 
of the Commission was beg'lm and. the former head. of the 
organization, Major Frank T. Payne, was charged with the 
violation of state cod.es regulating the expend! ture of state 
fund.s by District Attorney John Od.en.33 
The K1ngf1sh demanded the resignation of other 
officials answerable to him and set in motion a plan to 
oust others who opposed. him. While the press and opposition 
cried "spoilsman," it became increasingly clear that Long 
was determined. to have the support of men in major pos1 tions 
who would not hamper his program. 
One measure replaced nine members of the Orleans 
Parish Levee Board with a five member group appointed by 
the governor. The Fuqua and Simpson forces were replaced 
by Long1tes and opponents of the Ring. The bill also 
eliminated the New Orleans mayor as an ex-officio member 
of the Board.J4 
Another attack was leveled against the State Board 
32 
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, May 
28, 1928. 
JJ 
News item in the New Orleans Times-P1ca;y:une, June 
J, 1928. 
J4Acts, State of Louisiana, 1928, pp. 10?-08. 
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a broad. educational program was begun, 39.6 per cent of all 
white males und.er twenty-five had never received more than 
four years of schooling.24 In no small way, this condition 
was fostered by the role of the Catholic Church in the 
state's ed.ucational arrangement. 25 Thus, the free textbook 
law was not merely a device to attract a Catholic bloc-vote, 
but a means of modernizing the entire educational structure 
within the state. 
Opposition to the free textbook law centered in 
the anti-Long city of Shreveport in Caddo Parish, the only 
parish to oppose the issuance of #30,000,000 of bonds for 
highway construction purposes. The forces were led by a 
long-time political enemy, Mayor L. E. Thomas. "This is 
a rich section of the state," said Thomas, "we are not going 
to be humiliated lor degraded by having it advertised that 
our children had to be given books free. 1126 At the same 
time, the Baptist State Convention, meeting in Shreveport, 
saw in the law a religious issue and passed. a resolution 
condemning it. 
24 Computed. from the United States Bureau of the 
Census, Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940. 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945). 
25Key, 2R• £11•• PP• 157-58. 
26 
Long, 22• ~·• PP• 114-15. 
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Long bided his time until conditions were in his 
favor. A delegation from Shreveport called. on the Governor 
to ask his support for a project that would be important to 
Shreveport's economy. The federal government wanted to 
build an airport for its Third. Attack Wing adjacent to the 
city. All that was needed was an eighty-acre plot, which 
was under state control. It would. be a paper transaction 
for the state to deed the land to the city so the require-
ments for the fed.eral agreement could. be met. Long, however 
since Shreveport continued to reject the free textbooks, 
maintained that "people so well off don't need an air-
port."27 
An act had been introduced and. passed by the 
Legislature in May authorizing cities to acquire such land 
"within or without" the parish and donate it to the federal 
government. However, in the official record.ing of the law, 
28 the words 11 or without" had. been omitted. The problem was 
solved when Caddo Parish agreed. to accept the free textbooks 
if the Governor would call a supplemental session to correct 
the error. 29 
Acts, 
27. 
27 Long, 2£• cit., p. 115. 
28 Louisiana House Journal, 1928, pp. 242-44; 
State 2£ Louisiana, 1928 (Baton Rouge: 1928), 
and 
pp. 26-
29 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
December 10-12, 1928. 
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of Hea1th. Long dismissed the Presid.ent, Dr. Oscar Dowling, 
who was accused of wasting fifty thousand. dollars per year. 
The doctor, however, refused to vacate his office. The 
administration, therefore, passed a bill ending Dowling's 
term of office on August 24, 1928, instead of 1932.35 
Dowling appealed. to A ttroney-General Percy Saint, who 
d.eclared that the removal was not legal.J6 However, Dr. 
Dowling was "forced." out of the office and replaced by a 
Longite, Dr. Joseph A. O'Hara. The Louisiana State Supreme 
Court upheld the new appointment in January of the following 
year.J7 
The assault on the Conservation Commission resulted 
in a powerful lever in the manipulation of state patronage. 
Dr. v. K. Irion refused to vacate his office on the Dowling 
plea of unconstitutionality. Opponents claimed that Long 
was und.oing the work of many years of depoli ticalizing the 
body. To eliminate the type of hinderance caused. by Irion 
and Dowling, an administration bill was passed. giving the 
Governor the power to file "intrusion-in-office" suits 
35Lou1siana House Journal, 1928, pp. 66J-64. 
36 
OSinions of the Attorney-General of Louisiana, 
~. to April ~. 1930 (New OrleanS: 1930), pp. 
37 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
January 8, 1929. 
without the aid or consent of the Attorney-General if any 
persons 11 obstructed the operation11 of a state board .• 38 
Although the Governor achieved an unexpected degree 
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of success, he was slowed. by many setbacks. One administra-
tion measure which failed. would have given the Governor the 
authority to reorganize the New Orleans Charity Hospital 
complex and to achieve control of the Crescent City's Court 
House Commission.39 Although a long delay in the higher 
courts was obvious, Long's bill to appoint additional Court 
of Appeal justices did not win a majority.40 Long likewise 
failed to have approved. bills which provided for the 
replacement of seven Orleans Parish tax assessors with one 
man, replacement of the Orleans Parish Ring-backed sheriff, 
and a $35,000 appropriation to boost the size of the state 
m1litia.41 
The Legislature, in regular session, added 297 laws 
to the statute books, but certain others were vetoed. by the 
Governor. The opposition focused much attention upon the 
cattle-tick eradication bill which was vetoed. by Governor 
38 Acts, State of Louisiana, 1928, pp. 117-18; and 
news item-r:n-~e New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 2, 1928. 
39LoU1siana House Journal, 1928, p. 222. 
l~O Louisiana House Journal, 1928, p. 429-37. 
l~l News item in the New ~ Times, July 29, 1928. 
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Long. Many said the measure was unworkable and Long claimed 
that he feared bodily harm would result from forced cattle 
dipping. He did not believe the law would. be workable in a 
state which was still "open range" by law. In a lengthy 
and d.etailed veto message, Long explained. why he favored the 
move. "Some little reflection on the score of human psychol-
ogy had better be made before we make a move that reqUires 
the state militia."42 However, the opposition claimed that 
the only reason that Long opposed. the bill was that the 
opposition had instituted it and was afraid that enactment 
might eliminate his following of small farmers with whom 
the bill was popular.43 
An appropriation of $20,400, earmarked for the 
Conservation Commission, was also vetoed. Critics claimed 
that Long was motivated by a d.esire for personal revenge 
against Chairman Francis Williams, who had broken with 
Long during the 1928 gubernatorial campaign and had become 
a Ring leader.44 Long stated that the Commission had fund.s 
available and had "performed practically no service of 
benefit and use and is not now performing any practical 
42 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, July 
14, 1928. 
!~J News item in the ~ York Times, July 29, 1928. 
44 
Kane, 22• cit., p. 65. 
service to the public." It should, therefore, he replied, 
be made to exist "on the sum which was approximately the 
amount the same Commission operated. on when it ad.mittedly 
was of benefit to the public." Williams' bitter response 
was that Long had "no more scrupples than the assassin who 
cowardly conceals himself in the d.ark and strikes his 
adversery from beh1nd."45 
Two other bills introduced by anti-Long forces 
were killed by the Governor's veto. One measure provided 
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that delegates to the national conventions must be picked 
only by state convention. Another limited the salary of the 
Highway Commission attorney and required his residence to 
be in Baton Rouge. 46 
Following his vetoes, Long suffered many assaults 
from various publications, the Nation attacked: 
Every proposal for legislation, every acceptance of 
a bill, every appointment to office, every public act 
of Mr. Long, has been d.estined to create for him a 
slave-like political machine~ thwart the will of the 
people, mock the legislature and. circumvent the laws 
•••• The result has been4to spread the weight of spoils politics everywhere. 7 
45 News item 1n the New Orleans Times-Picayune, July 
1L~. 1928. 
46 
Hermann B. Deustch, "Kingdom of the Kingfish," New 
Orleans Item, August 10, 1939. 
47 George Goad, "I'm the Constitution of LoUisiana," 
Nation, CXXVIII (1929), 418-19. 
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In contrast, one of Long's most critical biographers 
stated: 
Not Huey, but the political system was to be blamed. 
Theoretically, the various boards had been previously 
taken out of politics. But as a single party and a 
single machine had dominated. Louisiana for decades, all 
governmental agencies were an integral part of the 
corrupt system. Non-politicalizing the boards in effect 
had merely permitted Ring henchmen to enjoy perfect job 
immunity, creating foci of permanent political power. 
Though not subject to the spoils system of each 
governor, the board.s were all part of a complicated. 
regeme of a vicious political elite tied up with the 
large corporations and underworld. Huey h!S ~ 2:£ 
exactly ~ ~ ~. or else be another meek corporation 
and underworld. puppet like his predecessors. Whether 
his purposes were genius, whether the reforms he 
espoused were worthi8and important, are separate questions entirely. 
In an attempt to fulfill a campaign promise, natural 
gas for New Orleans, the Kingfish set off another contro-
versy. Natural gas had been piped from north Louisiana 
to within a few miles of the crescent City. But in 1921, 
New Orleans had granted New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 
(NOPSI) a franchise which stipulated that the city could 
purchase the properties of that utility company at a 
specified rate and operate them under municipal ownership. 
By 1928, NOFSI still monopolized the power to city con-
sumers, including artificial gas at the high rate of $1.)5 
48carlton Beals, The Story 2! Huey f· Long 
(Philadelphia: v. B. Lippencott Company, 1935), p. 92. 
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per thousand. cubic feet (MCF). Although many interests 
sought the opportunity to sell New Orleans natural gas from 
the field.s in the Monroe area at a cheaper rate, NOPSI had. 
convinced the Commission Council that such offers were not 
practical. Governor Long's verbal assault, unlike those of 
earlier governors, was followed by d.irect action. 49 The 
Kingfish had Senator Fernand.ez of Orleans Parish introduce 
a battery of measures authorizing the Commission Council of 
New Orleans to issue $50,000,000 in bonds for the purchase 
of NOPSI 's properties and instituting enabling acts for the 
operation of the utility service.5° With the bills as 
leverage, Long, in an ill-worded attempt to squelsh 
opposition by the Ring, said: 
A deck has 52 cards and in Baton Rouge I hold. all 
52 of them and can shuffle and deal as I please. I 
can have bills passed or I can kill thim. I'll give 
you [NOPSI] until Saturday to decide.5 
On Saturday, June 25, NO PSI agreed. to allow natural 
gas into the city at a consumer rate of $0 .90 per thousand 
cubic feet (MCF) plus a $0 .25 monthly meter charge.52 
49Beals, ~· cit., p. 73; and Long, op. cit., PP• 
111-112. 
5°Louisiana Senate Journal, 1928, pp. 219, 445-LI·7· 
51News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 
26, 1928. 
52Hermann B. Deutsch, ~· cit., p. lJa. 
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The legislative session end.ed in July with a general 
triumph for the Kingfish. Long had been able to obtain most 
of the important laws he had sought. He had been handed 
several setbacks but, for the most part, they were minor. 
The major exception was the request for the occupational 
license tax on the petroleum industry, which would have 
been used to finance improvements in the state's school 
system, hospital complex, and mental ward.s. 
Following legislative adjournment, the Kingfish was 
faced with the problem of securing backing for his 
constitutional amend.ments which increased the gasoline tax 
and endorsed the road construction bond issue. The bills 
had been passed. by the Legislature, but they had to stand 
the test of radification at the polls on November 16, the 
same day Hoover faced Al Smith in the national election. 
DUe to the religious issue, Hoover had a considerable 
following in Louisiana, and party captains felt the need. of 
conducting an active campaign in the normally Democratic 
state. Long, therefore, campaigned during the summer months 
with a dual purpose.53 
53 
Thomas Harris, The Kinfiish, Huey P. Long, 
Dictator (New York: Pelican Pub~shlng company, 1938), pp. 
44=46. 
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The principle criticisms against the amendment to 
raise the gasoline tax was that there was no safety check to 
guarantee proper handling and expenditure of the funds. The 
New Orleans machine claimed that Long was being handed a 
"political war chest." To silence his opponents, the King-
fish announced on August 22, 1928, that if the amendments 
were ratified, he would name a "road bond. advisory committee 
of eleven outstanding citizens to supervise the handling of 
funds." The names he mentioned were described as "unim-
peachable" by both factions.54 
On August 29, 1928, the two largest commercial and 
civic organizations in New Orleans, the Young Men's Business 
Club and the Association of Commerce, voted approval of the 
bond issue in spite of Ring opposition.55 
The Ring demand.ed a special legislative session to 
be called to legalize the Road Committee by penning it into 
the act. The Kingfish agreed. to this, if the Ring would, 
in turn, back the amendments during the special session and 
later at the polls in November. The Ring attempted to duck 
the issue by answering in an ambiguously worded message and. 
on September 19, 1928, issued an unmistakable statement of 
54 Hermann B. Deutsch, "Kingdom of the Kingfish," New 
Orleans Item, August 14, 1939. 
55 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
August 30, 1928. 
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opposition. 56 
Governor Long sent the text of the proposed addition 
to the amendment to all members of the Legislature with the 
request that they inform him whether or not they would vote 
for it. The Ring voted ttNo.u Their bloc-vote made it 
impossible to secure the necessary two-thirds vote for a 
constitutional amendment. Therefore, the Governor announced 
that no special legislative session would be called57 
On November 16, the voters of the state approved both 
constitutional amend~ents with an overwhelming majority. 
In the Crescent City, only two of the seventeen wards 
rejected. the amendments; one ward by only five votes and 
the other by only three votes.58 
Jefferson and. St. Bernard parishes, to the south of 
New Orleans, were the Mecca of gambling and vice, operating 
under the indulgent eyes of corrupt local officials.59 
Traditionally, these parishes had gone their way, un-
56neustch, loc. cit. 
57 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
August 23-0ctober 23, 1928: and Long, ~· £11•• pp. 117-18. 
58News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
November 17 and 18, 1928. 
59Martin, ~· £!!., p. 52. 
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challenged. by state officials. The new Governor was urged 
by the New OI•leans Association of Commerce and several state 
newspapers to muster an attack on the illegal gaming. Long 
issued a characteristically strong statement to the Times-
Picayune: 
I warn them now that if gambling continues in New 
Orleans ••• the state militia will patrol the streets 
of the city. We are not going to stand for open law-
lessness in the New
6
orleans area d.uring the four years 
that I am governor. 0 
The ed.ict went unheeded and gambling continued in 
st. Bernard. Parish, with the newspaper boasting of the 
61 fact. A few days later a detachment of state militia 
was mobilized to raid gaming houses in st. Bernard Parish 
to serve, in Long's words, "as a warning to all gamblers 
in the New Orleans area.n 62 The troopers broke up tables, 
ripped out roulette wheels and "slots," and. confiscated a 
reported $25,00o. 63 
The St. Bernard Parish Sheriff, L. H. Neraux, hastily 
August 
60 
News item in the New Orleans Times-Pica,une, 
1, 1928: and the New York Times, August 1 , 1928. 
61 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
August 10, 1928. 
62 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
August 12, 1928. 
63News item in the New Orleans Times-Picazune, 
August 11, 1928. 
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gave approval: 
He [Governor Long] and the people of the state may rest 
assured that even if I have to aband.on my weekend 
vacation, there will be no repetition of lawbreaking in 
the parish. [st. Bernard] while I occupy the office of 
sheriff. 6LI· 
Many of the state's newspapers denounced Governor 
Long for the raids, and state Attroney-General Percy Saint, 
in an official ruling, declared that the raids were illegal 
because the Governor had not declared martial law before 
calling out the militia.65 The Kingfish replied that "no 
one had asked him [Saint] for h1s opinion.u 66 The Governor 
continued: 
We have paid no attention to, and will pay no 
attention to any opinion of the Attorney-General 
protecting the gambling interests, or which would 
make ig impossible for us to enforce the law of the 
state. 7 
There were three possible motives for the Governor's 
raids on the gambling establishments: a political move to 
please his predominately Baptist, hill-parish voters; 
64 
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
August 12, 1928. 
65
opinions 2! the Attorney-General 2! Louisiana, 
lla.Y !. 1928, ~April 1Q.,_ 12.2Q, pp. 51-53; and the New 
Orleans Times-Picayune, November 18, 1928. 
66 Quoted in Martin, ~· cit., p. 53. 
67News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
November 19 and 20, 1928. 
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an attack on a region that was largely anti-Long; or an 
attempt to cut off gambling funds to the New Orleans Ring, 
in the fight against Long. Whatever the case, little gain 
came from the raids. They stirred. up the opposition in the 
lower parishes and contributed to the growing belief that 
Long was a dangerous "Tin-pot Napoleon."68 
Following the November approval of the constitutional 
amendments, Long called a special six-day session to meet 
on December 10, 1928. The Legislature was to pass enabling 
acts to permit highway construction to begin immediately. 
Attorney-General Saint requested that the Governor include 
in the call an anti-gambling and racing law, since the pres-
ent laws were "inad.equate." The Governor replied by stating 
that he could. not understand why Saint wanted additional 
laws, ttwhen he won't enforce the laws we now have and. keeps 
interfering with me when I try to enforce them.n 69 
On the first d.ay of the special session the Governor 
spoke to the Legislature: 
I urge you to speed up your work, suspend your 
rules to advance bills, conclude your business and 
adjourn within the six d.ay time lim1 t placed on 
68 Martin , 2R• cit., p. 53 . 
69News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
December 2, 1928. 
the session.7° 
With the will of the voters clearly shown in the November 
polling, the Legislature had little choice in the matter. 
69 
The rules were suspended. and. the bill was..- passed. in record 
time.71 
LoUisiana's most sensational murder case alienated 
Governor Long and two powerful state figures, Lieutenant-
Governor Paul Cyr and publisher John Ewing. Dr. Thomas E. 
LeBoeuf and Mrs. Ad.a Dreher had been convicted. of ·the 
murder of Mrs . Dreher's husband James. The two were 
sentenced to be hanged. Thus, Mrs . Dreher would be the first 
white woman in the history of the state to go to the gallows. 
Colonel Ewing 's Daily States and the Shreveport Times 
suggested. clemency, a commuted sentence. Under pressure, 
Long did grant a reprieve from December 21, 1928, until 
January 5. 1929. In a rare stand with the Governor, the 
hostile Times-Picayune endorsed. the Governor's refusal to 
commute the sentence: "We think the Governor's reasoning and 
7°News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
December 11, 1928. 
71 Louisiana House Journal, Third Extra Session, 
1928, (Baton Rouge: 1928); Louisiana Senate Journal, Third 
Extra Session, 1928 (Baton Rouge : 1928}; and the New Orleans 
Times-Picayune, December 14-19, 1928. 
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decision are alike sound. We honor him for the courage he 
d.isplayed. 11 72 Lieutenant-Governor Cyr, however, a personal 
friend of Mrs. Dreher, roared., "How long have I been 
humiliated. by having to deal with this man," when Long 
refused to commute the sentence.73 He further claimed that 
the Governor had. "double-crossed." him.74 He stated that the 
Governor had agreed to leave the state so that he, as acting 
governor, could issue reqUisite commutation of sentence 
warrants. 75 
The convicted murders were executed on February 1, 
1929, after the first clegree murder charge was upheld. by 
the State Supreme Court. In public statements, Lieutenant-
Governor Cyr and Attorney-General Saint, who had also 
entered the fight against Long, made it appear that the 
Governor was personally responsible for the executions. 
72Editorial in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
January J. 1929. 
73Quoted in Martin, ~· cit., p. 54. 
74New Orleans Item d.ispatch of January 11, 1929: 
"Franklin, La., Jan. 10-- 1 I 'd. not only settle the LeBoeuf-
Dreher case, but I would pardon the kidnappers,• Lieutenant-
Governor Paul Cyr remarked. here this afternoon, upon his 
return from a futile visit to Baton Rouge, in response to a 
suggestion that Governor Huey P. Long might have been 
kidnapped." 
75News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
January 4, 1929. 
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Unaware of imminent impeachment, the Kingf1sh could 
look back on his first eight months in office with justifia-
ble pride. Although his efforts to extend and consolidate 
gubernatorial control of patronage met with considerable 
opposition, the fulfillment of many of his campaign promises 
had add.ed up to a progressive and free-spending program. 
That program was opposed and resented by conservatives but 
fell far short of radicalism.76 
76sindler, ~· cit., p. 61. 
CHAPTER V 
CONSERVATIVE COUNTERATTACK 
While the anti-Longs termed. their position in the 
tradition of "good government," they were, in fact, more 
concerned with the outcome of the game or politics than how 
the game was played. Conservative opposition to Long was 
translated into impeachment primarily because the Kingfish 
sought to root his power in the loyalty or the masses of 
voters. Inevitably, as the lower classes were made aware 
of their political strength, there would occur a political 
restructuring disadvantageous to the interests of the upper 
classes. "The anti-Longs resorted. to impeachment in order 
to prevent a distasteful present from becoming an unbearable 
future." 1 
Having finished a special session a scant two months 
before, the state's Solons were jolted. by a call for 
another session. This time, Long d.irected the Legislature 
to convene on March 18, 1929, for a six-d.ay special session 
to overcome certain objections raised by the United States 
Supreme Court to laws he had fostered. The Governor stated 
that he would also 1nclud.e in the call a provision for 
1 Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long's Louisiana: State 
Politics, 1120-19g2 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1959 , P• 1. 
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collecting the state's full share of the inheritance tax as 
allowed by federal law, a change in the paving laws to 
facilitate the highway program in Orleans Parish, and "one 
or two other matters.n2 
On March 15, 1929, the "other matters" were revealed. 
The Governor called for legislation levying an occupational 
tax of five cents a barrel on the refining of oil.J The 
funds, he explained, were desperately need.ed. for the 
ed.ucational program, the tuberculous sanitariums, the mental 
wards, and the institutions for the deaf, dumb, and blind. 
The Governor continued: 
Practically all the business and professions pay 
a privilege license ••• but such privilege license, 
up to this time, has not been assessed upon the oil 
industry of the state •••• I am hoping that the 
oil trusts will not make any opposition to this form 
of 11ceij8e, as they have done to progressive movements 
before. 
There was little doubt that the state's indigents 
~ews item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 
4, 1929. 
J Ten months earlier, in regular session, Long had 
introd.uced his occupational license tax of five cents a 
barrel of oil, but had withdrawn it in the face of fierce 
opposition. 
4News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 
16, 1929; and see the full text of the bill in LoUisiana 
House Journal, Fourth Extra Session, ill.2, (Baton Rouge: 
1929) t pp. 9-10. 
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and public institutions would benefit from the proposals. 
But there was also the belief that, at least in part, the 
Kingfish's motives lay in penalizing the Standard Oil Compa-
ny, the "Octopus" against which he had never ceased to rail. 
That Standard. itself felt it was being singled out as a 
target was never a question. Standard Oil President D. R. 
Wells, upon hearing of the special session, immediately 
came to Baton Rouge, established headquarters in the Hotel 
Heidelberg and remained for the entire session. 
The Kingfish's success in the regular session and in 
the December special session had perhaps swelled his ego. 
His call for a special session of only six days, was in 
itself evid.ence that he expected little difficulty in getting 
his measures approved .• 
As the official proceedings of the state Legislature 
indicate, the atmosphere had turned. "to a white heat. 11 5 
Chambers for commerce, boards of trade, lawyers, special 
correspondents, corporation lobbyists, Standard Oil agents, 
and the ex-office holders of the Ring converged on Baton 
Rouge. The Standard. Oil Company, with 8, 000 employees in 
Baton Rouge alone, announced that it would not meet the tax 
Sauey P. Long, Every Man .! King: ~Autobiography 
2f. Huey 1:• ~ (New Orleans: National Book Company, 1933), 
P• 123. 
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and would close its refineries if pressured.6 The anti-
Longs saw their chance and enlisted firm support from civic 
and commercial organizations throughout the state.? 
The tone of the special session was set when Rabbi 
Walter Piser refused. an invitation to deliver the opening 
prayer because he "could not call down the blessing of 
God on such a governor."8 To accomplish the Governor's 
bidd.ing in six days, it would be necessary for the Solons 
to suspend the legislative rules. However, the necessary 
two-thirds vote was not secured.9 Thus, two days later, 
his occupational license tax no nearer introduction than 
it was on the first, Long asked. the Legislature to ad.journ 
the session, then promptly called a new one--this time for 
a more realistic eighteen d.ays, beginning on March 20, 1929. 
6 Harnett T. Kane, Louisiana Ha~ide: The American 
Rehersal !2£ Dictatorship, 1928-1940 :New York: William 
Morrow and Company, 1941), p. 69. 
7 Communications read into the Louisiana House 
Journal, Fourth Extra. Session, .!.2£2. (Baton Rouge: 1929), pp. 
9, 19-20; and Louisiana Senate Journal, Fourth Extra 
Session, ~ (Baton Rouge: 1929), PP• 5-6, 9, 14-15. 
8 Stan Optowsky, The Long6 of Louisiana (New York: E. 
P. Dutton and Company, fii'C., 19 o>: p. 46. 
9 Louisiana House Journal, Fourth Extra Session, .!.2£2, 
pp. 10-11; and Louisiana Senate Journal, Fourth Extra Session, 
!.2,g,2, PP• 11-12. 
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The business elements of the state, under the leader-
ship of Standard Oil, undoubtedly comprised the major forces 
in the anti-Long battle. To that core were recruited such 
political enemies of the Kingfish as his former ally, Ewing, 
Cyr, Sullivan, the Ring, and the "New" Ring, as well as a 
flood. of opportunistic politicians once pro-Long but now 
d.eserting what they believed to be a sinking ship. 
On March 20, 1929, the first day of the new session, 
the House protested Long's personal lobbying on the floor 
and. Jared Y. Sanders, Jr., the son of the former Gove.tmor, 
introduced a resolution condemning Long for "trading 
votes.u10 On the floor the same day, Lieutenant-Governor 
Cyr made his sensational accusation: Long had. approved the 
leasing of $1,800,000 worth of Louisiana oil lands to a 
Texas oil company at terms grossly unfair to the state and 
had attempted. to bribe Cyr into supporting the occupational 
license tax.11 Cyr continued by describing Governor Huey 
P. Long as the 
worst political tyrant who ever attempted to rule 
the state • • • making a fight against the largest 
10Louisiana House Journal, Fifth Extra Session, 
1929 (Baton Rouge: 1929), p. 6; the~~ Times, March 
22, 1929: and the New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 21, 
1929. 
11Long 1s approval constituted no more than a routine 
permission to drill, and the leases in question were 
transferred in the Parker administration. 
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industry of Louisiana. If the good Lord will ever 
forgive me for supporting Huey l~ Long, it will take 
a great load off my conscience. 
The Lieutenant-Governor also warned that "from today on 
I promise to keep as close an eye on the governor as one 
man can keep on another. ~ • .13 
The futility of the session was d.emonstrated when 
the Senate created a committee to investigate the needs of 
the state institutions and the House announced that lengthy 
hearings would. be held. This meant that there would. not 
be enough time left for the enactment of legislation.14 
On March 21, 1929, Governor Long's crude intimidation 
of the press in the Manship affair was revealed by Charles 
Manship, publisher of the anti-Long Baton Rouge State Times, 
in a carefully worded front-page editorial entitled, 
"This Gentlemen, Is The Way Your Governor Fights.tt15 
According to Manship, the Governor had warned him that if 
1~ews item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
March 21, 1929. 
13Quoted in Martin, Dynasty: ~ Longs g! Louisiana, 
P• 57• 
14Lou1siana House Journal, Fifth Extra Session, 
~. PP• 15-16; LoUisiana Senate Journal, Fifth Extra 
Session, ~. pp. 10-ll; and the Times-Picayune, March 
2l, 1929. 
15Ed1tor1al 1n the Baton Rouge State Times, March 
21, 1929. 
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he persisted in his opposition to the occupational license 
tax, there would be published "a list of names of the people 
who are fighting me who have relatives in the insane asylum.u 
Manship continued. by noting that he had a brother, Douglas, 
who was in the East Louisiana Hospital undergoing psychiatric 
treatment.16 
The legislators were outraged by this low blow. On 
March 22, Colonel Ewing's Shreveport Journal called for an 
investigation of the Governor, with a view toward impeach-
ment, in an ed.itorial entitled, "Time to End Tyranny.nl7 
Two days later a worried Governor was urging Solons to 
draft their own tax measures to satisfy the financial 
needs of the state charitable institutions and the schools. 
But the tide of anti-Long charges continued to rise, 
culminating in a most grave--or most absurd--accusation 
which led. to events helpful to the forces in favor of 
impeachment. 
16rbid. 
17Ed.i torial in the Shreveport Journal, March 22, 
1929; and Sind.ler, ~Long's Louisiana: State Politics, 
1920-~, P• 62. 
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At the night session of the Legislature, March 25, 
1929, there was "an atmosphere of excitment.n18 The date 
has become known as "Blood.y Mond.ay" in Louisiana history.19 
Bepresentati ve Cecil Morgan of Shreveport, Cadd.o Parish, 
demanded recognition from Speaker Fournet, a Long captain, 
on a point of personal privilege. It was an open secret 
that Representative Morgan intend.ed to read an affidavit 
accusing Governor Long of seeking to arrange the murder 
of an anti-Long state official, Representative Jared Y. 
Sanders, Jr., the son of the former Governor. 
Speaker Fournet instead recognized a Long stalwart 
who, having knowled.ge of the Morgan plot, moved for 
immediate ad.journment ~ lli· Morgan leaped from his 
desk, his hand waving a document. "I am speaking, and I 
will not yield. the floor," he yelled. "I have in my hand 
an affidavit from a Baton Rouge citizen that the Governor 
has tried to procure the assassination of a member of the 
House.n 20 
18News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
March 24, 1929. 
19The official record gives no indication of the 
irregularity. 
20Quoted in Opotowsky, QE• cit., P• 42. 
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The affadavi t, Morgan charged, had been signed by 
the Kingfish' s former bodyguard., "Battling" Bozeman , who 
had detailed how Long had promised him "many gold dollars" 
to leave J[ared]. Y. Sanders, Jr., in a ditch. 21 Even as 
Morgan spoke, Speaker Fournet banged his gavel. A motion 
to adjourn the session, made by a Long legislator, had 
been recognized. The House would vote. 
There was bedlam now. Legislators formed. a cordon 
around Representative Morgan and escorted him to the front 
of the chamber. A torrent of shouts rained through the 
House , and Speaker Fournet called, "A motion to ad.journ 
~ lli is recognized. A vote." 
The Representative scurried to their seats to press 
their buttons on the electric voting machine. On the vote 
on the adjournment motion, the electric tally board behind 
the Speaker recorded the individual votes every which way. 
"Fi:r:l Fixt The machine is fixed!" was the cry. Mason 
Spencer, a Representative, leaped to the rostrum, seized. 
the gavel from Speaker Fournet's hand, and began pounding 
wildly . Another climbed up the ladder to the voting machine 
and then leaped down atop a pocket of angry legislators. 
21 For the completed text, Louisiana House Journal, 
Fifth Extra Session, 12£2, pp. 29-J2. 
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Order was restored only after it was discovered that 
the voting machine had not been cleared after the last roll 
call vote.22 The roll was called by voice: 71 votes 
against adjournment, 9 votes in favor. The House recessed 
until morning.23 
Bloody Monday ended with the wildest free-for-all 
in a Louisiana legislative hall since the days of 
Reconstruction. It also marked the beginning of a 
political battle that was to shape Louisiana politics for 
24 
many years. 
The next day the administration backers, now a 
minority, made attempts to introduce resolutions of 
adjournment. Speaker Fournet read a formal statement to 
the House deploring the previous days' malee, acknowledging 
"his own fault" in the confusion, and explaining the 
22All but the most extreme anti-Longs accept this 
version of the story. Even the hostile Times-Pica~e, 
March 26, 1929, did, for as Long pointed out, the cerk of 
the voting machine was a nephew of Senator Ransdell, who 
was at that time an anti-Long leader. 
2Jtou.isiana House Journal, Fifth Extra Session, 
1929, P• 41. 
24This study of Bloody Monday is based on Martin, 
~· cit., PP• 58-60; Sindler, ~· cit., PP• 62-63; 
Opotowsky, ~· £!!•• pp. 46-47; Times-Picazune, March 26, 
1929; and an interview with James LOwery, secretary to the 
late A. o. Campbell of Mid-Continent Oil and Gas and a 
licensed lobbyist, who was present at the time. 
ttmechanical difficult1es . u25 The House, including some 
members who might normally have sid.ed. w1 th Long but who 
bell eve d. he had. tampered with the machine, was clearly 
impeachment minded.. 
The state's press reacted in predictable fashion. 
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In its edition of March 27, the conservative Times-Picayune 
placed. its stamp of approval on the movement to remove 
the Kingf1sh from office: "The reason for this is that 
he is tempermentally and otherwise unfit to hold office. 
His tactics and methods reveal him to be a cruel political 
tyrant.u 26 
Of the two constitutional methods provid.ed. for the 
removal of a governor, recall and impeachment, the anti-
Long forces, for obvious reasons, selected the latter . The 
House thus assumed the role as a jury of indictment, to 
weigh the evid.ence presented . By the time the impeachment 
list reached the desks of the legislators, it includ.ed. 
every charge under which a Louisiana governor could be 
impeached, with one exception: "habitual drunkeness." 
PP• 
25 Louisiana House Journal, Fifth Extra Session, 12£2, 
27-28. 
26 Ed.1 tor1al in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 
27, 1929. 
8) 
The nineteen articles charged the Kingfish with the 
following offensess use of his appointive power to influence 
the judiciary, and boasting of that use of power; misuse, 
misapplication, and misappropriation of state fund.s; bribery 
and attempted bribery of state legislators; securing of 
undated resignations from appointees of the Orleans Parish 
Levee Board; contracting illegal loans for the state; 
removal of public school officials for political purposes; 
unlawful use of the mlli tia to subord.inate the civil 
authority, with reference to the early 1929 raid.s on New 
Orleans gambling; attempting to force parish officials to 
follow his dictation in political litigation as the price 
of permitting passage of legislation affecting such 
parishes; habitually carrying concealed weapons; violent 
abuse of officials and citizens visiting him on official 
business; gross miscond.uct in public places; publicly 
flouting the state and f ed.eral constitutions, and. usurping 
the power of the Legislature; purchasing a $20,000 ice-
machine for Angola Penitentiary without advertizing for 
bids; intimidating the press in the Manship affair; 
demolishing the Executive Mansion without express legislat-
tive authority and spending $150,000 for a new Mansion; 
disposing of and. destroying furniture in the E:J:ecuti ve 
Mansion without authorization or accounting; unlawfully 
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paroling a convict from the state penitentiary; repeatedly 
appearing within the bar of the House of Representatives in 
violation of the state Constitution; and suborning murder 
in attempting to hire "Battling" Bozeman to assassinate 
Jared Y. Sanders, Jr. 27 
Anti-Long forces gathered in New Orleans to set in 
motion a Constitutional League, head.ed by former Governor 
Parker, to "uphold the Constitution of Louisiana." Ewing's 
Daily State referred to the meeting of about three hundred 
persons in the St. Charles Hotel as 
the most representative gathering of citizens that 
has been held. in Louisiana within a decade •••• a 
consid.erable number of business men in the meeting 
announced subscriptions of $1,000 each •••• [whenl 
the subscriptions were closed., the total was estimated 
at $100,000. This was done in 15 minutes.28 
The duration of the special session became an issue 
on April 5, 1929. The eighteen d.ay session originally 
called would end at midnight of the following day. An 
Attorney-General ruling had. established. the right of the 
Legislature, as an impeachment court, but not as a law-
making body, to remain in session. 29 Thus the supporters 
27Lou1siana House Journal, Fifth Extra Session, ill,2, 
PP• 51-52. 
28 News item in the Baton Rouge DailY States, June 11, 
1929. 
29 Opinions 2! the Attorney-General of Louisiana, May 
!.• 1928, ~April 2Q, ill.Q, pp. 188-9). 
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of the ad~inistration raised the objection that the state 
Legislature was not a court of impeachment until a charge 
had been adopted and transmitted to the Senate so that 
they could legally remain in session. The House processed 
the charges so slowly, however, that only the Manship press 
intimidation item had been adopted favorably by April 6, 
1929.30 
The timing of these actions in the House was seized 
upon by Long and his nine attorneys as the basis for his 
legal d.efense in the Senate. The Kingfish 's "Exception and. 
Demurrer No. 1" reasoned. that House action after the date 
of adjournement specified in his call was illegal. That is, 
he recognized the Manship charge as the only legal item of 
impeachment. On May 15, the Senate rejected Long's argument 
by vote: 19 yea, 20 nea. Long's "Exception and Demurrer No. 
2 11 argued that in the Manship affair he had. acted in a 
personal rather than an official capacity. The Senate, on 
May 16, sustained this point on a narrow margin.31 
The latter vote was seized. upon by the associates of 




Louisiana House Journal, Fifth Extra Session, ~. 
Ibid., PP• 2L~5-65. 
to an immediate close. The Manship charge, the only one 
voted. on before the session legally ended, was not an 
impeachable offense. Testimony further revealed that the 
threat came to Manship through a reporter under circum-
stances which weakened its credibility.32 Therefore, 
fifteen of the thirty-nine Senators brought forth the 
celebrated Round Robin.33 The document, filed by Senator 
Philip H. Gilbert, stated.: 
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On motion of the und.ersigned Senators of the state 
of LoUisiana, and. on suggestion to this Honorable 
Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, that •••• 
all charges of impeachment preferred against the said 
Huey P. Long, Governor, after April 6, 1929, were 
unconstitutional, illegal, null, and void ••• the 
undersigned, constituting more than one-third. of the 
membership of this Senate, sitting as a court of 
impeachment, do now officially announce that by reason 
of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of all 
impeachment charges • • • will not vote against Huey 
P. Long ••• [and~ we move that the Senate ••• 
adjourn ~ die.JJf 
Since the conviction required an absolute two-thirds 
majority vote in the Senate, the anti-Longs had no choice 
but to accept the Round. Robineers• motion for adjournment 
~ lli_. The Kingfish thus emerged. the victor in the 
32 
Louisiana House Journal, Fifth Extra Session, ~. 
PP• 129-34. 
33The fifteen names were signed. in a circular manner 
so that the order of signing could. not be determined. 
34Louisiana Senate Journal, Fifth Extra Session, 
!2S.2,. p. 265. 
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supreme battle of his career.35 
Foes of the Kingfish have never ceased to belabor the 
climax of the impeachment trial as a deliberate mockery 
of justice. That view, however, overlooks the fact that 
"justice" was never present, hence could not be mocked.36 
The impeachment was politically inspired from beginning to 
and and, therefore, the Round Robin was a piece with the 
rest of the play. 
The unbelievable sloppiness with which the forces 
opposed to Long pressed their case against the Governor 
was a reflection of the political nature of the impeachment. 
The charges were selected indiscriminately, the hearings 
were forums of personal revenge, and the entire effort 
was d.i ffus ed. 
The failure of the impeachment counterattack was most 
costly to the conservative cause. The Kingfish spoke 
g:rimly of the future, "I used to try to get things done by 
saying 1 please • 1 That didn't work and now I am a d.ynami ter. 
35 Sind.ler, .2la• cit., p. 65. 
36Ibid. 
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I dynamite 1 em out of my path.u37 And when the newspapers 
howled at the Robineers, Long laughed. and agreed with the 
press that "theirs is the earth and the fullness thereof.nJ8 
Thus, the sterile trial of impeachment served to intensity 
his class program. 
37 Davis, ~· ~·· P• 119. 
38News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, July 
18, 1929. 
CHAPTER VI 
HUEY LONG, GOVERNOR-SENATOR, 1930-1933 
Long 1 s efforts to complete his program traveled. on 
a rough road. Occasionally, Long advanced a mile, then 
fell back two miles. At times he was forced into wide 
detours. The K1ngfish had. promised to be a Dyna.m1 ter. In 
the end he became one. For at least another year, however, 
he found it expedient to say an occasional "please." 
There is a popular belief that the end of the hearing 
for impeachment marked. the end of all organized poll tical 
resistance to the Long program. This is far from accurate. 
The Kingfish remained in a precarious position for months, 
but his opponents never again seriously threatened his 
political existence. 
Much of the K1ngf1sh 1s uncertainty in official 
affairs stemmed from the disposition of the charges against 
him. The charges were not d.ropped when the Legislature 
adjourned. Instead, they were merely shelved. Conceivably, 
although unlikely, the charges could. have been revived at 
the 1930 regular legislative session. In any event, the 
K1ngfish was uneasy about their presence until much later, 
when the charges against him were officially removed. 
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The first evidence of the continued. antipathy toward. 
the Kingfish came, as might be expected, from New Orleans. 
On September 6, 1929, the Constitutional League issue a 
news statement listing the names, positions, relationships, 
and salaries of twenty-four persons who were supposed to be 
relatives of the Governor. Accord.ing to the League, the 
relatives of the Governor were drawing $75,849.40 per year 
in state sala.ries.1 
Long scoffed at the charges, saying that he had 
never heard of a "ninth cousin" or a "cousin of an in-law." 
He further stated that he was expecting "the League of Nations 
to soon investigate the rooster at the state penitentiary to 
see if the state is not feeding some of my relatives without 
cbarge. 112 
As usual, however, the Kingfish did not stop at 
ridicule. General Campbell Hughes had been named the 
President of Louisiana State University, but he had not 
formally taken office. General Hughes• brother,however, had 
been prominent in the formation of the Constitutional League. 
Hence, it was wrong to employ allies, reasoned the Kingfish, 
it was equally wrong to employ enemies. The Governor 
1 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
September 7, 1929. 
2 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
September 28, 1929. 
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announced a new president to replace Hodges.3 
On July 18, 1929, in an open-letter to the Governor, 
a comm! ttee of bankers and. 1nd.ustr1alists pet! tioned Long to 
end his "political test1ng. 11 The letter continued that if 
the Governor would not tm.d.ertake to establish any form of 
an occupational license tax, a $20,000,000 chemical plant 
would locate in the state. The letter was signed by the 
chairman of the committee, Harvey c. Couch, President of the 
Louisiana Light and. Power Company and the LoUisiana and 
Arkansas Railroad.. The other signatures were penned. by 
seven presidents of various banks and commercial organizations. 
The Governor promised not to enact any license tax during his 
term in office in exchange for business• support of an 
alternative plan of taxation. 4 
The New Orleans Ring was romanced ny the Governor's 
hands-off policy in the January, 1930, mayorality contest 
)Ibid. 
4 
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, July 
19, 1929; and Allan P. Sind.ler, Huey Long's LoUisiana: 
State Politics, 1*20-1952 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1956), p. 8. 
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between Ring captain T. Semmes Walmsley and anti-Ring Francis 
Williams. Walmsley was elected by less than ten thousand 
votes. The Governor, it was presumed, could have sw1mg five 
thousand city votes one wya of the other had. he activily 
intervened in the election. 
To gain further favor in the Crescent City the 
Governor mad.e vague hints that additional state revenue 
could usefully be applied. to the $40,000,000 debt of the New 
Orleans Dock Board, a state agency. 
To bolster his position in the Legislature, on the 
first day of the 1930 regular session, the Governor made no 
mention of the controversial tick-eradication problem and, by 
strategic maneuvering, placed the problem of securing ad.d.i-
tional state revenues in the laps of the Solons. For Presi-
dent ~ Tempore of the Senate, the Kingfish backed. the 
candidacy of a Senator who had voted. in favor of his impeach-
ment in one of the two votes and who had. not been one of 
the Ro bineers. 5 
The Kingfish 1 s concessions reaped. a meager reward. 
Longites, reduced from its majority proportions in 1929, 
faced anti-Long forces who remained sufficiently numerous 
and cohesive to prod.uce a stalmated session. The factional 
5News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, May 12, 
1930; and. Louisiana Senate Journal, .!.2.2.Q (Baton Rouge:1930), 
PP• L~-5. 
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alignment of the lawmakers was made evid.ent at the beginning 
of the 1930 regular session of the Legislature.6 Forty-
four of the one-hundred. state Representatives supported a 
motion to reorganize the House which has as its ultimate 
purpose the outser of John B. Fournet from the spea.kership.? 
Alvin o. King, of Lake Charles, replaced. Robineer Philip 
H. Gilbert as President Pro Tempore of the Senate.8 
A few days before the opening of the May 11, 1930, 
regular session, the Governor had created. a tempest when he 
had hinted that he might run for the United States Senate.9 
According to the Governor: 
I am practically sure I'm going to run but I 
won't if I have to let that good friend of mine, the 
Lieutenant-Governor, get the office. I love ~0m too much to impose the duties of Governor on him. 
The influencial Times-Picayune, which continued. to 
1930. 
~ews item in the New Orleans Times-Picayupe, May 12, 
?Louisiana House Journal, .!.2lQ (Baton Rouge: 1930), 
PP• 14-15. 
8Louisiana Senate Journal, 1930. pp. L~-5. 
9By the Constitution of 1921, the Governor could not 
succeed himself. Long had almost two years remaining in his 
term. The law has since been amended .• 
1930. 
10News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, May 5. 
serve as a vocal agent for the renewal of the impeachment 
proceed.ings, leveled. the charge that Long was "bluffing" 
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about running for the Senate and that the hint was made as a 
11 
strategic move to win legislative support. Due to Long's 
unstable position in the Legislature, however, the Governor's 
announcement was received with little notice by the state's 
lawmakers. 
The technique of mass appeal via circulars, initially 
used by the Kingfish when campaigning for his first office, 
had also been successfully employed to gain public support 
during his impeachment fight. Thus, with d,ecisi ve poll tical 
battles plainly in sight and. with every major newspaper in 
the state against him, the Kingfish established. his own 
newspaper. On Thursday, March 27, 1930, the first issue of 
~ Louisiana Progress appeared.. 
To get ~ Louisiana Progress rolling, the Governor 
hired Trist Wood., a famous Louisiana political-cartoonist, 
and set up the newspaper plant just across the state line 
in Mississippi. The Progress served. a double purpose. It 
would saturate the public with the Kingfish's accounts of 
programs in public works and. construction; it would also 
11 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, May 
5, 1930. 
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magnify his opponents• shortcomings, drench them with a steady 
stream of adverse personal publicity and, where possible, 
ridicule their achievements.12 The Progress always featured 
cartoons by Trist Wood. pictorializing the opponents of the 
Kingfish as snakes and. buzzards. 11 Trist, 11 as he signed him-
self, portrayed the major New Orleans newspapers as grotesque-
looking characters who told lies and nothing but lies. The 
Constitutional League was a favorite of Trist•s pen. The 
League was characterized as a balky little mule carrying a 
group of broken-down politicians. 
From the standpoint of circulation and financial 
stability, the Progress was an immed.iate success. As Long 
recorded., "Our friend.s throughout the state voluntarily 
solicited subscriptions1J for the Progress. We began to 
make life merry for our enemies with cartoon, statistics, 
and comparisons.1114 Getting the paper to its readers was 
never a problem, according to one of Long's most critical 
12 
Long, .QR• ill·· pp. 188-93; Martin, ~· cit., pp. 74-
75; ans Sind.ler, 2.12.• ill•, 70-71. 
13 The Progress sold for five cents per issue or for 
two dollars for a one-year subscription. 
1l~ 
Long, £2• cit., pp. 188-89. 
biographers, 
Squads of them [state policemen 1, assisted. by the 
ublqutous highway crews, gave th~ paper the most 
unique circulation organ1zat1on.l5 
~ Louisiana Progress began as a weekly, but the 
frequency of the paper's appearance was almost a barometer 
of the K1ngf1sh 1 s political fortune. An increase in his 
oppo~ents 1 act! vi ties spelled. an increase in publication. 
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The most controversial item of the regular session 
was the Governor's "good roads measure," a $60,000,000 high-
way bond issue, which by necessity was submitted. in the form 
of a constitutional amendment. The measure was never able 
to secure the absolute two-thirds majority vote in each 
chamber which was required for its passage. The Governor 
was able to holdback a host of opposition measures through 
outright legislative rejection, insertion of weakening 
amendments, or gubernatorial vetoes. The Governor vetoed 
four major bills: $6,400 for "additional expenses for the 
Lieutenant-Governor while acting Governor;" a similar amount 
for the Attorney-General, who was "acting counsel" for the 
Constitutional League; 16 a $100,000 appropriation to pay 
15 
Martin, ~· cit . , p. 74. 
16 
Long, ~· cit., 210. 
the cost of the impeachment proceedings; and the popular 
tick-eradication bill.17 
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On the last clay alloted for bills to be entered. on 
the legislative calendar, the administration introduced. a 
measure calling for a constitutional convention. 18 The bill, 
however, was at the bottom of a congested. calendar and was 
further hampered by a delaying tactic employed by the enemies 
of the administration. Representative Allen Ellender moved 
that the procedural rules be changed so that the convention 
bill could be considered out of its regular order.19 A 
compromise, however, left the measure for a convention in its 
normal position with a pledge from the opposition that it 
would stop its delaying action. 20 The measure calling for 
a convention passed the House by a narrow margin: six votes.21 
17 Typical of his poll tical ad.roi tness was his 
approval of the legislatively-sponsored measure providing 
for a tick-eradication program, followed by his veto of a 
companion appropriation bill. Long felt that while the 
state remained 11open range," such a law was unworkable. 
18 Louisiana House Journal, 1_23__Q, p • .397; and. the 
Louisiana Senate Journal, IDQ., pp:-]24-25. 
19 
Allen J. Ellender, at the time of this writing, 1s 
the senior United States Senator from Louisiana. The junior 
Senator is Russell B. Long. 
20 
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 20, 
19.30. 
21 
Louisiana House Journal, ill.Q, pp. 646-47. 
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The indi vid.ua.ls opposed, to the convention continued 
their efforts to kill the bill. The Times-Picayune sent a 
wire to Lieutenant-Governor Cyr urging him to aid in the 
bill's defeat. 22 &litorially, that newspaper also leveled 
an attack on the measure: 
While pretending to limit constitutional change to 
three subjects, the bill in facts permits the complete 
rewritting of the Constitution, it is revolution entire. 
It does this by providing for submission of the 
convention's work to the approval of the voters. Thus 
the constitutional convention demanded by the Governor 
is a wide open convention.23 
Most sources agree with Long's own version of what 
transpired in the Senate: 
When our bill for Constitutional Convention reached 
the Senate, a. well-designed. filibuster was organized. to 
be carried. out largely through the cond.uct of the 
Lieutenant-Governor. At the beginning of every morning 
session, some opposition Senator rose to a point of 
personal privilege and. spoke throughout the d.ay. 2LJ. 
No member of the Senate, not a party to the plot, 
could. secure recognition from the presiding officer, the 
Lieutenant-Governor. The filibuster continued for days, 
until Long conclud,ed that his position would best be served 
22 
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, July 
4 and. 5. 1930. 
23 
Editorial in the New Orleans Times-Picazune, June 
21, 1930. 
24 
Long, 2.E.• ill·· 206-07. 
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by having the session end in filibuster. 25 
When the 1930 regular legislative session ended, it 
was evident that Louisiana finances "had come to a stand-
still." The appropriations for all state agencies had been 
reduced and. no new revenue-producing measures had. been 
enacted to relieve the situation in the future. However, 
by holding the Governor to a stalemate in the Legislature, 
the anti-administration forces inadvertently encouraged him 
26 to carry his case d.irectly to the people. 
On July 17, 1930, a week after the Legislature 
ad.journed, the Governor made an official announcement, via 
The Louisiana Progress, that he would oppose the incumbent, 
United States Senator Joseph E. Ransdell, 27 a veteran of 
thirty-two years of Congressional office. The sole issue of 
the campaign, as he saw it was the program which had been 
killed by the Legislature. The Kingfish further stated that 
if a "majority of people, voting in this Senatorial contest, 
do not cast their vote in my favor then I am willing to admit 
that the people do not want the program which I have en-
25 
Long, £E• £!!•• p. 207. 
26 
1.:2!£., p. 211. 
27 The Governor scathingly referred to the goateed 
Senator Ransdell as "old Feather Duster." 
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dorsed. tt He also repeated an earlier announcement that due 
to the riff with the Lieutenant-Governor, he would not leave 
the state until his gubernatorial term expired.. 28 There 
were hurried protests that Louisiana Senatorial representa-
tion would. suffer, but Long brushed. the objections aside by 
saying that "with Ransdell as Senator, the seat was vacant 
anyway.n29 
As Long recorded in his autobiography, Every ~ ~ 
King, ttit was the battle of Louisiana's history. For once 
the public press was united.--all against me.n3° 
The Kingfish introduced. novel campaign methods into 
the Senatorial race. He hired two "gaugy, expensive sound. 
trucksu31 to spread the Long message across the state. The 
trucks became, in Long's own word.s, "the first portable 
appliance ••• ever used in a political campaign.u32 He 
28 
News item in The Louisiana Progress , July 17, 1930. 
29 
Long, £E• £!!., p. 213. 
30 
!lli.· 
31 Reinhard. H. Luthin, American Demagogues: Twentieth 
Century (Gloucester, Mass .: Peter Smith, 1959), p. 251. 
32 
Long, 2E• cit., p. 220. 
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began a baby-sitter service to be used. at outdoor rallies. 
The Kingfish also made frequent use of the tool that was 
soon to become his major device for spreading his plans to 
Share Our Wealth: radio. His broadcasts always began the 
same way: 
This is Huey P. Long talking, but I 1m not going to 
say anything important for the next few minutes so you 
can go to the telephone and call up four or five of your 
friends and tell them to tune in too. 
Long waited almost until August to shift his campaign 
into high gear. Senator Ransdell had proceeded him, moving 
from one parish seat to another, conducting his campaign in 
the "courtly, restrained manner of trad.i tional southern 
politicians.u33 Ransdell was virtually helpless against 
the Governor's parish-saturation technique. The voters 
were seeking a newer and. fresher figure for public life. 
To many of them the goateed, seventy-two year old Senator, 
stilted and formal, had become a shopworn political type.J4 
At St. Martinsville, St. Martin Parish, the Governor, 
in his first major speech, repeated his claim that the "main 
issue" of the Senatorial race was the endorsement of his 
general works and state highway construction programs. He 
JJMartin, 2£• £11•• P• 77• 
34Luthin, 2£• £!!•• P• 252. 
recounted. his free textbook battle and deno1mced goateed 
"old. trashy mouth11 Ransd.ell for his aid. to the "predatory 
interests and Wall Street in sending our young men in[to] 
Nicaragua, Venezula, and Honduras." Long inadvertently 
introduced the race issue with a statement of opposition 
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to the appointment of John J. Parker, of Norht Carolina, to 
the United States Supreme Court.3S The speech concluded 
with a pledge to support the farm relief program that the 
seventy-two year old Senator opposed. ind.ependence for the 
Philippines, the abandonment of the differential tariff on 
Cuban sugar, and "freedom from foreign entanglements.n36 
In mid-July two other LoUisiana notables, Frank L. 
Looney, a Shreveport attorney, and August Williams, a 
former Longite, entered the Senatorial race. Williams, who 
did not believe "any thing should. be allowed to stand in the 
35 Senator Ransdell had. backed the appointment of 
Judge John J. Parker to the United. States Supreme Court. 
To organized labor, Parker represented the "yellow dog" 
contract. Accord.ingly, Ransdell was rejected by the 
LoUisiana Federation of Labor. In d.efense, Ransdell held 
that the National Association for the Ad.vancement of Colored 
People had opposed. Parker, and his pro-Parker stand had. been 
cond.i tioned by racial, not anti-labor consid.erations. 
Therefore, continued. Ransdell, Long's attack on his support 
of Parker ind.icated. that Long favored racial equality. 
)6 
News item in the LoUisiana Progress, August 7, 
19)0. 
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way of accomplishing the defeat of Long,tt37 withd.rew early. 
On August 9, 1930, Looney withdrew from the contest to 
11 back Ransd.ell. u38 With the campaign narrowed to only two, 
State Senator William c. Boone framed. the race between Long 
and. Ransd.ell as a choice between "honest or dishonest 
government in Louisiana. "39 
The opposition chose Huey P. Long himsel~ as the 
campaign issue. Colonel Sullivan, of the 11new11 Ring, 
apoligized. ~or having previously backed Long and predicted 
that if Long was elected, he would not be seated.. The 
Colonel, who was soon joined by J. Y. Sanders, Sr., of the 
40 Ring, and August Williams, stated. that: 
29, 
Jesse James was a gentleman compared with Long, because 
Jesse James at least wore a mask. Long has the face of 
a clown, the heart of a Rfi'tty larceny burglar and the 
disposition of a tyrant. 1 
At a New Orleans rally for Ransdell, Joseph A. 
37 News item in the New Orleans Times-Pica;rune, July 
1930. 
38 
News item in the New Orleans Times-Pica;r1me, 
August 10, 1930. 
39 
News item in the New Orleans Times-Pica;rune, 
August 11, 1930. 
40 
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picazune, 
August 24-26, 1930. 
41 
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
August 23, 1930. 
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Finnerman denounced Long as a "false friend of labor, u42 
although a few days earlier William Green, President of the 
American Federation of Labor, had personally endorsed Long 
in a letter to ~LoUisiana Progress.43 
The press of the state was led. by the Times-Picayune 
in its assault on Long. Banner-line stories accused the 
Governor of forcing all state employees to make a "voluntary 
contributiontt of one-tenth of one month's salary to fill his 
campaign chests, 44 and. using prison labor "to the exclusion 
of free labor in the painting of auto tire covers" publi-
cizing his cand.id.acy.1~5 Even the venerable N2 ~ Times 
hoped not to see Long "transfer his political methods and his 
personality to the floor of the already suffering Senate. 1146 
The claim by Walter B. Hamlin, a New Orleans attorney, 
is typical of the position maintained by the anti-Long camp: 
11The real issue is Huey P. Long, his political debauchery 
L~2 
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
August 20, 1930. 
43 
News item in ~Louisiana Progress, July 31, 1930. 
44 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
August 8, 1930. 
45 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picazune, 
August 29, 1930. 
46 News item 1n the ~~Times, August 31, 1930. 
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and corrupt! ve influence in Louisiana politics •114·7 
In the final d.ays of the campaign, Long fired a final 
shot at "concentrated. wealth." The Wall Street capitalists, 
said Long, 
must be made to realize that they cannot go on piling 
up millions and millions of dollars. They may call it 
[Long's criticism] socialism, but let them disown me. 
Every law th~t isn • t for capitalist is always called. 
socialistic.q,8 
Lieutenant-Governor Paul Cyr, fiercely anti-Long, 
provided the backdrop for election week. Cyr announced. 
that the Constitution of 1921 prohibited. a state official 
from holding a fed.eral office: 
If Long should be elected. Senator, he will either 
have to resign his seat in the Senate, or will cease 
to be governor of Louisiana.49 
Lieutenant-Governor Cyr, continuing his broadsid.e, accused 
Long of attempting to get out of the state before the crash 
that 
is bound. to come as a result of the financial situation 
to which his extravagant and. corrupt administration has 
brought the schools and institutions of the state.50 
47News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
August 31, 1930. 
48 
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
August 30, 1930. 
49 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
August 27, 1930. 
50 
News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
August 28, 1930. 
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In the September primary, Long steamrolled. Ransdell 
in every section of the state. Even in st. Bernard. Parish, 
the scene of the raids on gambling by militia men, Long 
scored an astonishing victory--Long: 3,970, Ransdell: 9. 
The vote would suggest a solid endorsement of the Long 
program by the people of Louisiana, as shown in the following 
results:51 
Orleans Other State % State 
Long 38,682 110,958 149,640 57·3 
Ransd.ell 43.373 68,078 114,511 L~2. 7 
Total 82,055 179,036 261,091 
A comparison of the above table with the table on 
page 43 shows that the Governor increased his proportion 
of the total state vote from 43.9 per cent in 1928 to 57·3 
per cent in 1930. It should be noted, however, that the 
total vote cast in 1930 declined. 27,824 from that of 1928. 
Most of the decreased. turnout came from parishes other than 
Orleans. Long was backed by approximately the same number 
of voters outside Orleans Parish in 1928 (109,023) and in 
1930 (110,958). At the same time, he more than d.oubled his 
number of allies in Orleans Parish in 1930 (L~7 per cent) 
compared with that of 1928 (23 per cent). 
51 Computed from Compilation of Primary Election 
Returns 2! the Democratic Party, State 2! Louisiana, held 
September 9, 1930. 
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Comparison of Figure 2, page 16, Figure 3. page 44, 
and. Figure 4. page 108 lead.s to the conclusion that elements 
of continuity were superimposed on those of change. In 1930 
as in 1928, Long possessed relatively greater strength in 
the old Populist strongholds, and. relative weakness in the 
Delta, the Sugar Bowl, and. the urban areas. 
Peace doves, an almost extinct species, appeared in 
Louisiana shortly after the Senatorial primary. Long's 
victory at the polls broke the factional stalemate in the 
state. It was commonly held that all measures should be 
passed backing his ttgood. roads" project. Although there 
were some d.ie-hard.s, such as Representative Gilbert Dupre, 
of Opelousas, who had. earlier accused. the Governor of 
"spending state money in a whore house,u52 and who also 
maintained: 
The Legislature may ratify what they [Longites] propose, 
the people confirm it, but I am going to be dismissed 
from the bargain. I am going to vote No, ev~n if I 
am the only member of the House to d.o this .5J 
The vogue, however, was away from Representative 
52 
Louisiana House Journal, Fifth Extra Session, ~. 
(Baton Rouge: 1929), p. 97. 
53 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 





Dupre's opposition. The day following the primary, the 
gnat-~ly of the administration, the Constitutional League, 
issued. a terse announcement: It was disband.ed • .54 The same 
d.ay, Mayor T. Semmes Walmsley, the Ring standard-bearer, 
appeared at Long's suite in New Orleans with a delegation 
o~ civic leaders to congratulate the Senator-elect.55 
A special legislative session o~ eight days was 
called immediately a~ter the primary. The Ring struck a 
bargain with the Governor which committed. it to back a 
constitutional amendment, to be voted on by the people of 
the state in November, for $?5 ,000,000 in new highway bonds; 
a $5,000,000 bond issue ~or a new skyscraper state capitol 
building; a one-cent increase in the tax on gasoline; and 
withdrawal of the 1929 impeachment charges. In return, 
Long endorsed a plan to set aside one-half of the revenue 
from the gasoline tax increase to bolster the Port of New 
Orleans' sagging credit; a bond issue ~or a New Orleans 
airport; $?, 000, 000 o~ the road. bond. ~und.s orr construction 
of a free bridge across the Mississippi River at New Orleans; 
and funds ~or an intercoastal waterway.56 All measures 
.54Long, .Q2• .2ll· t p. 235. 
55 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
September 22, 1930. 
56 News item in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
September 23, 1930. 
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were passed.57 
The ease in which Long's program was enacted, however, 
should. not overshadow the fact that Representative Dupre was 
far from being the only Solon to oppose the Kingfish. In 
spite of the margin of victory in the Senatorial primary 
and the entente between the Governor and the Ring, twenty-one 
of the one-hundred members of the House opposed the motion 
by Repz·esentati ve Allen J. Ellend.er to wi thd.raw the charges 
of impeachment against the Governor. Further, the Times-
Picayune, although less hostile, editorially warned that due 
to the amount of control given Long, he would. personally be 
responsible for the political future of the state.58 
By 1931 the dominance of the Long forces in the state 
was evid.ent. The barometer of Long • s success, ~ Louisiana 
Progress, a weekly at the beginning, after the acceptance of 
the constitutional amendments in November, 1930, converted 
to a monthly publication. 
After the Senatorial primary, Long did not leave the 
state for fear that Cyr would seize power. Cyr, aided by 
various anti-Long! tes, had. never ceased. to insist upon the 
57 Acts, State of LoUisiana, Regular Session, !2J£, 
EXtra SesSIOns, 12lQ and !2J£ (Baton Rouge: 1932), pp. 5-
33. 3941 t 45::1.~7' 57-58. 
58 Editorial in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 
November 5, 1930. 
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unconstitutionality of Long's dual role as Governor and 
United States Senator-elect. On October 13, 1931, Paul Cyr 
announced that since Long "could not possibly be governor" 
that he, Paul Cyr had been sworn in as the Governor of the 
state by a notary public in Shreveport. He further stated 
that the temporary "capitol" was now the Heidelberg Hotel.59 
Cyr later moved the "capitol" to his home in Jeaneratte. He 
became a laughing stock. Throughout Louisiana wags sought 
out notaries public so that they also could be sworn in as 
Governor of Louisiana.60 
Long, however, upstaged even Cyr's performance. He 
announced that if Cyr had taken the oath as Governor be 
was, therefore, no longer Lieutenant-Governor. Long swore 
in the President pro tempore of the Senate, Alvin 0. King, 
as Lieutenant-Governor, and had the state payroll so 
adjusted. 61 
59Long, 2£• £1i•• pp. 287-88; Martin , 2£• £!!., 
PP• 86-88; Optowsky, 22• £1!•, pp. 57-58; and the New 
Orleans Times-Picayune, October 13-27, 1931. 
60 Although Long went along with the various gags and 
pranks during the "Governors' Battle," the Secretary of 
State, Alice Lee Grosjean, d.id not accept any of the joke 
credentials. 
61 
The same month that Long left Louisiana to claim 
his Senate seat, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in a 4-J 
decision, maintained that it lacked jurisdiction in the Cyr 
case and the United States Senate was the proper body to 
determine the date on which Long qualified as a Senator. 
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To keep in operation the program started during his 
administration, Long announced his ucomplete the Work 11 
ticket: for Governor , state Highway Commissioner o. K. Allen , 
of Winn Parish , a boyhood friend; for Lieutenant-Governor, 
Speaker of the House Fournet of Bloody Monday fame during 
the 1929 impeachment battle . 62 
A south Louisiana Catholic , Dudley J. LeBlanc , headed. 
the ticket which provided the major anti-Long force in the 
1932 campaign, although Earl Long , Huey ' s younger brother , 
ran for Lieutenant-Governor on the ticket of George s . 
Guion . 63 
The outcome of the January 9 , 1932, primary was a 
victory for Longism . Allen's entire nine-man ticket won 
office with him . 
Long remained in the state only long enough to 
observe the victory of o. K. Allen as Governor-elect . On 
January 25 , 1932 , with Alvin King as Governor, United States 
Senator Huey P . Long left Louisiana by train for Washington , 
n. c. 
6~ews item in the Louisiana Progress , November 10 , 
1931. 
63Two minor gubernatorial candidates , William Boone, 
and. William Clark , received. a combined total vote of 1 , 346 . 
CHAPTEB VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Before Huey Long entered LoUisiana politics, so the 
folklore goes, the voters had no choice. As Long liked to 
say, Louisiana had been suffering from the Tweedled.um and. 
Tweed.ledee administrations: "One of them skinned you from 
the ankles up, the other from the neck down ."1 Since Huey 
Long, the people of the state have had the choice between a 
venal administration with a d.ynamic platform, or an honest 
corporation-puppet ad~inistration. Like most popular myths, 
these ideas are tempered by exaggeration; yet as popular 
myths often d.o, they contain an element of truth. 2 
I. SUMMARY 
In the years following Reconstruction , the positions 
of power in Louisiana were assumed by a hierarchy repre-
senting the upper-income groups: the old. plantation class 
and. the new and. rising business interests. By the turn of 
1 
Harnett T. Kane, Louisiana Hafride: The American 
Rehersal !!2.£ Dictatorshi}, 192B-19Lt·ONew York: William 
Morrow and Company, 1940 • p. 62. 
2 
v. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics 1n State~ Nation 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 1610~. 
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the century, all business factions were dwarfed by Standard 
Oil Company . 
The Bing, New Orleans ' Democratic machine, and. the 
Standard Oil Company usually emerged as the victors in the 
running battle between the Crescent City and the rural 
parishes. Influenced by the oil interest, the Ring moved 
the state into a civic vacuum with its ttsafen policies. 
The dominant influence of the Ring in state politics 
continued the trad.ition of upper- class rule . 3 
Huey Pierce Long, Jr . , was born in Winn Parish in 
1893, the seventh of nine child.ren. Winn Parish, with its 
thin red soil and. cutover loblolly pine patches, was poor 
in comparison with the more favored. sugar and. cotton 
parishes. However, the Longs were not "white trash, 11 they 
were middle-class farmers , with a respect for education and 
a strong desire to acquire it . After incomplete legal 
training at Oklahoma State University and Tulane Law School, 
Long passed a special bar examination and , at twenty-one, 
was licensed to practice law. Following an unprofitable law 
practice in Winnfield , specializing in industrial compensa-
3 Readers who regard classes as fictions and disagree 
with this writer ' s interpretation of them may nevertheless 
discover some interesting interpretations of a general 
nature in this chapter . While local Louisiana history has 
been examined. in terms of classes , the author has avoided 
treating them from a purely Marxian point of view since 
there was not sufficient evidence to justify it. 
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tion, Long sought the one state office open to him: Third. 
District Railroad Commissioner. In the runoff, Long won by 
a narrow margin. 
Having achieved statewide fame through his battles 
with the Standard Oil Company and a series of strategic 
rate cases, Long entered the 1921~ gubernatorial primary. 
However, the state was d.i vided by a religious conflict 
which was instrumental in bringing about Long's d.efeat. 
In 1928, when Long again filed for LoUisiana's 
highest elective office, neither of his opponents, singly, 
represented a threat to his chances of victory. Under the 
campaign banner Every Man a King , Long presented. a platform 
advocating free textbooks, free bridges, a vast highway 
construction program, natural gas for the larger cities, and 
the enactment of an occupational license tax on the Stand.ard. 
Oil Company. 
Although Long received only 43·9 per cent of the 
total vote cast, his opponents withdrew from the race, 
eliminating the need for a runoff, and Long was nominated 
as the Democratic candidate for Governor of Louisiana. 
It took Long several years to achieve his goals due 
to the implacable opposition of the upper-classes. Eight 
months after his inauguration as governor and the announce-
ment of his principle legislative demands, an attempt was 
made to impeach him. Long narrowly defeated the move by 
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securing a document, signed. by a sufficient number of Senators 
to block a vote for conviction, declaring the proceedings 
unconstitutional. 
The termination of the impeachment hearings did. not 
mark the end of organized political resistance to the Long 
program. The charges against the Governor were merely 
shelved and., conceivably, could have been renewed.. The 
uncertain position of the Governor resulted in a legislative 
stalemate in 1930. 
With two years remaining in his administration, Long 
announced his Senatorial candidacy, making the endorsement 
of his gubernatorial program the issue of the campaign, and 
pledging not to leave the state, if elected, until his term 
as governor had expired. 
Long's triumph in the Senatorial primary broke the 
factional deadlock in the state Legislature. Following the 
Senatorial primary, the Legislature, in special session, 
enacted. a major portion of the Long program, although there 
still existed. considerable political resistance. 
A few months before departing for Washington to claim 
his Senatorial seat, Governor Long announced. a Complete the 
Work slate, listing cand.id.ates he endorsed. for the nine 
major offices of the state. The entire ticket was approved 
by the voters of Louisiana in the 1932 Democratic primary. 
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II. CONCLUSIONS 
The popular view of Huey P. Long, such as that 
presented by R. H. Luthin in American Demagogues: Twentieth 
Century, dismisses him as little else but a highly success-
ful member of the family of southern poor-white leaders 
commonly termed. demagogues. The term 11 d emagogue11 usually 
refers to a professional "man of the people,tt one who 
proposes quack remedies insincerely for political or personal 
gains. To tm.cover a d.emagogue, the observer is to pay 
particular attention to irrational appeals, attempts to sway 
emotions, and. attention-getting tomfoolery.4 However, such 
criteria are inadequate and mislead.ing and. have made of the 
term a subjective epithet to be used with politicians one 
dislikes. t-lhether one is to be classified a demagogue or a 
statesman seems quite often to depend upon the respectability 
of one's followers and. upon the agencies of propaganda which 
oppose one. Thus, the validity of many charges of personal 
corruption leveled against Huey Long, while highly relevant 
to an interpretation of his record, for obvious reasons is 
4 Reinhard H. Luth!n, American Demagogues: Twentieth 
Century (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959), pp. 302-19. 
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impossible to determine on the single basis of public 
information. 
As w. J . Cash, in The Mind of~ South, was probably 
the first to note , Huey Long was the first southern leader 
to overwhelm the established. machine (the Ring] and bring 
it to terms . 5 In the words of v. o. Key , Jr .: 
He did not permit himself , in the oft-repeated. pattern , 
to be hamstrung by a legislature dominated by old hands 
experienced. in legislation and. frequently under corpora-
tion retainer . He elected his legislgture and erected. 
a structure of political power •••• 
However , Carlton Beals , 1n ~ Story 2f. Huey P. 
Long , wrote: 
his methods were inevitable, and in themselves not 
reprehensible. No intelligent critic should attack Huey 
Long too much fo~: the manner in which he smashed the 
die- hard clique . ·1 
And even Francis Butler Simkins , who framed Long 
as another Hitler or Mussolini , 8 stated that: 
perhaps the greatest tragedy of the twentieth century 
was not that such men (as Long] were so popular, but 
that the administration they aroused was not altogether 
5 w. J . Cash, The Mind of the South (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 19LJ.2), pp . 28LI·:s:5:" - -
6 
v. 0 . Key , Jr ., .2E• cit ., P• 157. 
7 Carlton Beals, ~Story 2!, Huey 1?_ . L}ng 
(Philadelphia : H. B. Lippencott Company, 1935 , p . 20 . 
8 
Francis Butler Simkins, A History of the South (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961). p . -.546. - -
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'lmderstood.9 
If Huey Long had merely created an efficient personal 
machine, his accomplishment, while noteworthy, would not 
have afforded him the attention he attracted in his own 
life or entitled him to the unique place he has in the 
annals of American politics. By keeping faith with his 
voters while Governor, Long provoked a rural lower-class 
revolution which exceeded that of Populism in durability 
and intensity. It aroused the political have-nots and 
showed them the total victory that was theirs for the 
balloting. By overcoming the appeals of localism and 
personality common to the one-party state, the revolution 
moved. the state into close approximation to a two-party 
system with the major parties Long and anti-Long. 
9Francis Butler Simkins, The South: Old and New 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19L~7}, p. 1~39.- - -
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